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In every negligence case, someone must ultimately decide
whether the defendant's responsibility or duty to the plaintiff includes
the risk which occurred. The issue is inescapable.' At common law, the
issue was disguised as what courts and commentators called proximate
cause. As any first-year torts student will attest, neither the explanation
nor the analysis of the issue was particularly satisfying. The authors of
the Restatement of Torts 2 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 called
the issue legal cause, an arguably more accurate name that sadly did
not meaningfully contribute to any greater clarity.4 Louisiana,
influenced by the work of Dean Leon Green and Professor Wex
Malone adopted another approach-the so-called Duty/Risk approach.
Leon Green, Wex Malone, and others defrocked proximate or
legal cause and pulled back the cloak covering the wizard. What Green
and Malone and others did was to make clear that proximate cause and
all its mumbo jumbo language, such as foreseeable, unforeseeable,
foresight, hindsight, direct, remote, natural and probable, intervening
causes, superseding causes, chains of causation, etc., were really not
rules of law, but descriptions of results.' They were shibboleths that did
nothing but befog. Green and Malone made clear that when a court
talked about proximate cause it was talking about two things: cause-infact-a factual question-and scope of duty or liability, which they
considered a matter of policy, not a result which the application of some
preexisting legal rule mandated.6
From Green and Malone's Legal Realist wisdom, the Duty/Risk
method of analyzing negligence was born. The Louisiana Supreme
Court essentially adopted that Duty/Risk approach to analyzing
negligence in a 1962 violation of statute case, Dixie Drive It Yourself
System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co.,' and in 1972, in a

1.
Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 73 (1956)
[hereinafter Malone, Cause-in-Fact].
2.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
3.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
4.
See id.
5.
See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus
American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1970) [hereinafter Malone, Dixie
Drive It].
6.
See, e.g., id.
7.
137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962).
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garden-variety negligence case where there were no statutes involved,
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.8 Duty/Risk became the so-called style
for negligence analysis in the state. Under the Green and Malone
Duty/Risk approach to negligence, the court should expressly confront
the scope of responsibility question and address it as a matter of policy
in every case.9
As Green and Malone clearly intended and as the Louisiana
Supreme Court initially implemented the approach, the judge, not the
jury, was the administrative actor who decided whether the duty the
defendant owed included the risk, which befell the plaintiff in the
manner in which it occurred.'o The Louisiana Duty/Risk method of
analysis turned the proximate cause question into a question for the
judge, rather than a question for the jury." To Green, the proximate
cause question (and he eschewed the phrase proximate cause) was a
question of policy for judicial determination.1 2 Malone agreed. 3
Years later, the American Law Institute, in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, followed
suit" and adopted something very much like the Duty/Risk approach."
Section 29 provides, "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that
result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious."l6 The
Restatement (Third) abandoned the terms "proximate cause" and "legal
cause" in favor of a scope of the risk analysis," similar to Green and
Malone's approach. But there is a critical difference between the
Green/Malone Duty/Risk approach and the Restatement (Third)
approach. While Green and Malone entrusted the scope of liability
question to the judge, the Restatement (Third) gives it to the jury (or
judge as fact finder)."

8.
9.
10.
5, at 377.
11.
12.

256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
See id. at 622; Dixie Drive It, 137 So. 2d at 304.
Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72; see Malone, Dixie Drive It, supranote
Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622-23.
LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 76-77 (1927) [hereinafter GREEN,

RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE].

13.
at 377.

Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5,

14.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABLITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
15.
Id
16.
Id § 29.
17.
Id § 26 cmt. a.
18.
Id §26 cmt. b.
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In 1997, my friend, the late Professor David W. Robertson
proposed essentially the same thing for Louisiana. He called his
approach, under which the jury would decide scope of the risk, a
"Keetonian" approach, in honor of the eminent torts teacher and
scholar, Dean Page Keeton.19 Dave and I engaged in a scholarly
conversation about the issue (and other negligence-related topics) in
the Louisiana Law Review.20 I did not overtly disagree with him, but
neither did I expressly agree. It is past time for me to admit that I was
wrong in not expressly agreeing.2 1 I did not then sufficiently
comprehend that there is a serious problem with entrusting the scope
of responsibility decision to a judge. The problem is that, in a gardenvariety tort case, policy is not at issue to any significant degree. What
is at stake is a basic question of fairness and common sense, which is
inextricably dependent upon the particular facts of the particular case.22
Consequently, the fact finder, not the judge, should decide scope
of liability or scope of the risk in a garden-variety tort case. The scope
of liability is not a legal determination.2 3 The scope of liability is a factspecific decision and its resolution is case-specific. It is not a question
of law. Law applies to classes of actors and classes of cases. It does not
change with the minute and particular facts of isolated cases. Deciding
what is fair and what comports with logic and common sense in most
garden-variety tort cases is exactly why we employ juries or judges as
fact finders, rather than lawgivers.
When judges decide both the broad duty question and the scope
of the risk question, they blur the line between the broad, legal duty
question and the scope of liability question in a specific case. Moreover,
this blurring leads courts to combine or conflate duty and scope of
19.
David W. Robertson, AllocatingAuthority Among InstitutionalDecision Makers
in LouisianaState-CourtNegligence and StrictLiability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1092-96
(1997) [hereinafterRobertsonAllocatingAuthority]; David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary of
Negligence Law: Continuing CausationConfusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1997).
20.
See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Cats or Gardens: Which Metaphor Explains
Negligence? Or, Is Simplicity Simpler than Flexibility?, 58 LA. L. REV. 35 (1997) [hereinafter
Galligan, Cats or Gardens]; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence:
Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57 LA. L. REV. 1119 (1997) [hereinafter Galligan,
Revisiting the PatternsofNegligence].
21.
Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 20; Galligan, Revisiting the Patterns of
Negligence, supra note 20.
22.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,

dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.").
23.

See id.
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liability.24 And, as noted above, the blurring of the line between duty at
a broad, categorical level and scope of liability at a case-specific level
blurs the allocation of decision-making authority between judge and
jury. This piece is a call for courts in garden-variety negligence cases
to clearly separate duty from scope of the risk or scope of liability and
to recognize that the fact finder should determine scope of liability
because the decision is not based on any broad policy, but on the facts
of the particular case and the fact finder's sense of fairness in that
particular case.
At the same time, and on a more technical level, Louisiana courts
have been inconsistent in their articulation or application of the
Duty/Risk method. They have stated the elements of negligence under
the Duty/Risk method in multiple, inconsistent ways. The courts should
clarify the elements of negligence, the order in which administrative
actors consider and analyze them, and, as noted, who should decide
what question.
In Part II, I set forth the traditional approach to negligence and its
elements. In Part III, I summarize Green and Malone's attack on the
concept of proximate cause and their solution. Part IV discusses the
birth of Louisiana's Duty/Risk method of analyzing negligence cases.
Part V describes the early leading Louisiana Duty/Risk cases and how
the courts did not and have not articulated and applied policy at the
case-specific level. The Part also argues that courts have not done so
because doing so is, in fact, inappropriate. The scope of liability in a
particular case is not a policy issue but a case-specific fairness issue.
Part V sets forth the inconsistent analytical approaches Louisiana
courts have used under the so-called heading of Duty/Risk. Part VI
briefly recaps, and Part VII discusses duty (not scope of liability) as
policy. Part VIII argues that it is time for Louisiana to follow the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Injury's approach to scope of liability and give the question to the fact
finder. Part IX briefly concludes.

24.
article.

The courts have also conflated duty and breach, but that is a topic for another
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THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO NEGLIGENCE

Traditionally, negligence had four elements: duty, breach,
causation, and damages.2 5 Thanks to the work of the realists and others,
the law now predominantly breaks the causation question into two
separate elements: cause-in-fact and proximate cause.2 6 Some,
including the Restatement 27 and Restatement (Second) of Torts,28
replaced "proximate cause" with "legal cause." Under the most
common approach to negligence, duty is a question for the court-a
legal question. 2 9 The other elements were all questions for the juryeither factual questions or mixed questions of fact and law.30 Expressed
in table form, negligence was:
Element
Duty
Breach
Cause-in-Fact
Proximate/Legal Cause
Damages

Who Decides
Judge
Jury
Jury
Jury
Jury31

In most tort cases, duty is essentially assumed as all persons owe
a duty to others to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks.32
There were and continue to be some exceptions to this generally
applicable broad duty to exercise reasonable care. For instance, in

25.
See, e.g., Kadylak v. Royal Caribbean Cruise, Ltd., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308
(S.D. Fla. 2016); Hayes v. D.C.I. Props.-D KY LLC, 563 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2018);
Denmanv. Coppola Gen. Contracting Corp., 683 N.Y.S.2d 617,618 (N.Y. App. Div. 3 1998).
26.

§

DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS

124, Westlaw (database updated June 2019) [hereinafter DOBBS ON TORTS].

§

27.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

28.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

9 (AM. LAWINST. 1934).

§9

(AM. LAW INST. 1965).

29.
See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primeron the PatternsofNegligence, 53 LA.
L. REv. 1509, 1510-11 (1993) [hereinafter Galligan, Primer]
30.
See id. at 1510-15.

Mixed questions of law and fact are defined "as questions in which the historical
facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is resolved and the issue is whether
the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated."
Mixed Question of Law and Fact Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.

&

uslegal.com/m/mixed-question-of-law-and-fact/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (quoting Bausch
Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 21 CT. INT'L TRADE 166, 169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)).
31.
32.

See Galligan,supra note 29, at 1510-15.
See DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 26, § 125.

2020]

LET THE JURY DECIDE!

775

certain, broad categories of cases, the law traditionally did not
recognize a duty even though the defendant's conduct posed a
foreseeable risk of harm to another. In each of these areas there were
policy reasons for not imposing liability. For instance, courts held that
a defendant had no duty to affirmatively act to help another person.33
Courts based this rule, in part, on the difference between misfeasance
and nonfeasance and the philosophical notion that one should have the
liberty to choose or to choose not to help another.3 4 Courts also held
that a defendant had no duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
against negligently inflicted emotional distress.3 5 That rule was based,
in part, on doubts about administrative competence.36 Courts doubted
that judges and juries effectively could determine whether someone
had really suffered emotional distress.37 The law doubted, given the
available science, that decision makers reliably could separate the real
from the fraudulent or overstated claims.38 There was also a fear that
the courts would be inundated with claims.39 Likewise, a defendant
owed no duty to protect against negligently inflicted economic loss
unless there was some personal injury or property damage as well.40
Courts based this rule on an administrative concern that otherwise tort
law would essentially devour the law of contracts." In addition, courts
were concerned that liability would be unlimited or potentially
unlimited thereby over deterring societal actors, i.e., frustrating
otherwise beneficial activity.42 And, knowing that a court had to draw
a liability/no liability line somewhere, there was a concern that
recognizing liability on a case-by-case basis would be arbitrary, thus
undermining reliance, trust, and confidence in the legal system.4 3
There were other no-duty rules. Today many of the traditional noduty rules have eroded to some extent. But where there is a duty today
in these former no duty zones, there are conditions or limitations to
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id § 405.
See id.
Id § 390.
See id.
See id
Id
See id
Id § 515.
See, e.g, E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transam. DelavellInc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).

42. See id at 874. It is fascinating that while courts have and do express concern for
overdeterrence, the concern is never empirically demonstrated. See, e.g, Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. AV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom White v.
AIV Testbank, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
43.
Louisianaex rel Guste, 752 F.2d at 1028-29.
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proceeding, so one might call them conditional or limited duties,
meaning simply that in many of the traditional no-duty cases, there are
requirements for recovery beyond causing a foreseeable injury to
another person. For instance, in a Louisiana negligent infliction of
emotional distress bystander case, the bystander must witness the direct
victims suffer injury or come upon the scene shortly thereafter, there
must be an identified familial relationship between the person who sues
for emotional distress and the person who suffered the injury, and
more.44

All of these old no-duty rules were based upon policy analyses
prevalent at the time the courts articulated them. These policy
justifications for traditional no duty rules are what Green might have
called the "administrative" factor.4 ' That is, the relevant policy had to
do with administrative concerns about the court's ability to consistently
deal with either a type of issue (psychological injury) or the volume of
litigation potential liability might spawn.46 The current conditions for
or limitations to recovery also reflect policy concerns, but the policies
apply at the categorical level, not at the case-specific level. That is, the
courts perform the policy analysis at a broad level of generality. The
decision not to recognize a duty or to create a conditional duty applies
to all similar cases; it does not turn on the facts of the particular case.
Even if limited or no duty rules yield harsh results in particular cases,
the broader policy objectives are served. At the categorical level, the
law should be predictable and consistent, if not always fair on the
particular facts.
Returning to the theme of the Introduction, duty is not as easy and
clear as I have just made it because one of the things that continues to
make duty and proximate cause confusing to the law student and
lawyer is Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgrafv Long Island
RailroadCo.48 It is confusing because the burgeoning lawyer reads it

when her class begins to discuss and study "proximate cause," but what
44.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020); see also Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224, p. 14
(La. 3/2/99); 728 So. 2d 1273, 1281 (holding that parents may not recover for emotional

distress associated with watching their son die after health care providers misdiagnosed his
condition).
45.

LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) [hereinafter GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY].

46. Id. at 84-87. Of course, there never seems to be any real empirical support for the
volume fear. The sky may well be threatening to fall (an allusion to the tale of "Chicken
Little"), but there is never any radar (an allusion to weather) to indicate that is actually about
to occur.
47.
48.

Id. at 77-87.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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Cardozo actually said (amongst other things) was that "[t]he plaintiff
sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another."49 That is, he
seemed to say there was no duty owed.o He continued: "[T]he orbit of
the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the
orbit of the duty."" But what is the relationship between proximate
cause and duty? Doesn't everyone, absent some broad policy or
policies applicable to classes of cases, owe a duty to protect against
foreseeable harm?52 It would seem so. But let me pause before giving
my answer to that question (which is yes) and turn to the work of Green
and Malone and the birth of Duty/Risk.
III.

GREEN AND MALONE AND THE ATTACK ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

No scholar writes on a clean slate. All work depends upon the
work of those who have come before, and there were many important
torts scholars before Leon Green whose work he built on.53 But Green
was singular and focused in his pointed and sustained attack on the socalled doctrine of proximate cause. Later, LSU Law Professor Wex
Malone joined Green in his assault. Green was a Louisianan who
gained fame elsewhere. Malone was a North Carolinian who achieved
fame for his work while teaching in Louisiana at LSU.
Green was a legal realist. Legal realism was a complex and
significant school of legal thought that really began to develop in the
early part of the twentieth century and flourished just before and during
the New Deal era. The realists were reacting to and challenging Legal
Formalism, which held that judges decided cases based upon existing
law and legal decisions. 56 The notion of the law library as a place to
discover the law is a formalist view of law because it implies that the
49.
50.
51.

Id at 100.
See id.
Id

52. See id at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Every one [sic] owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.").
For the modem view, see also DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 26,

§

125 (describing the elements

of negligence).
53. For a thorough discussion of the work both before and after Green, see Patrick J.
Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the PresentDarkness, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991).
54.

See, e.g., GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45; GREEN, RATIONALE OF

PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12.
55.
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Realism, 87 TEx. L. REv. 731, 734
(2009).
56.
See id at 750.
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seeker will discover the law in the law books included therein. A
thorough discussion of legal realism is well beyond the scope of this
Article, but to quote Professor Brian Leiter:
The Core Claim of Legal Realism consists of the following descriptive
thesis about judicial decision-making: judges respond primarily to the
stimulus of facts. Put less formally-but also somewhat less
accurately-the Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions
based on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather
than on the basis of the applicable rules of law.
Thus, in part, Green was reacting to and revolting against the idea
that there was a formalist, determinative "law" of proximate cause. To
Green and others, there were several inherent problems in the idea of
proximate cause. First, as mentioned above, courts were prone, when
referring to proximate cause, to lump what we now think of as causein-fact together with scope of liability as one element. 59 The separation
of cause-in-fact from the determination of the scope of liability (or
duty) was meaningful and significant. The former-cause-in-fact-is
a primarily factual question. The scope of liability (or duty) questions
involves other considerations. 60 In essence the separation of cause-infact and scope of liability meant negligence had five elements not four.
An additional objection to the traditional proximate cause analysis
remains the continuing tendency of some judges to refer to the "sole" 61
57. Now, one supposes the formalist would discover the law on his or her computer
searching legal databases.
58. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence,76
TEx. L. REv. 267, 275 (1997).
59.

GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note, 45 at 186-95; GREEN, RATIONALE OF

PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 132-41; see also Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1
(detailing cause-in-fact, including how it can relate to scope of liability).
60. Interestingly, while its roots are clearly in legal realism, the courts have sometimes
said it comports withthe civilian tradition. Landry v. Bellanger, 2002-1443, p. 13 (La. 5/20/03);
851 So. 2d 943, 953 ("civilian concepts" such as "duty/risk"); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,
521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988); Polkv. Blanque, 93-1740 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/15/94); 633
So. 2d 1382, 1387 ("Under the duty/risk analysis adopted in our civilianjurisdiction"); LeJeune
v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 539 So. 2d 849, 856, 857 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) ("civilian principles
of duty/risk" and "civilian duty-risk analysis"); Bishop v. Callais, 533 So. 2d 121, 123 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1988) ("civilian principles of duty risk").
61. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996); Turlington
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 795 F.2d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 1986); Adriatic Ins. Co. v. Holt, 617 So.
2d 184, 186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Thomas v. Champion Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 765, 770 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992); Everettv. La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 424 So. 2d 336, 341-42 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OwEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 452 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); cf CSX
Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 688 (2011) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352
U.S. 500, 504-06 (1957)) (discussing the traditional formulation of proximate cause).
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cause of an accident. The idea that there is a sole cause of any event is
ridiculous. Courts used and use the phrase "sole" proximate cause to
relieve a defendant of liability, finding either some other person6 2 or
even the plaintiff63 was the "sole" proximate cause of the injury. Courts
sometimes used the phrase in conjunction with the concept of the
intervening cause, which could rise to the level of a superseding cause64
and thereby break the so-called chain of causation and relieve the
defendant of liability.6 5 In common parlance, the superseding cause let
the defendant, perhaps a railroad or other industrially significant entity,

off the liability hook.
A related target for Green was the tendency of courts to relieve all
but the last piece or actor in the causation chain of liability.66 That is,
the courts overly concerned themselves with the sequence of events,67
rather than the logic or fairness of what had happened and how it had
happened, a trend that continues today.68 The adjective "proximate,"
meaning near, no doubt fueled this illogical fire. This tendency might
manifest itself in a conclusion that the injury was remote in time and
space from the defendant's negligent act.6 9 It is not reading too much
between the lines to say that the realists were more concerned with the
practical substance of things rather than the sequence.
Lastly, for present purposes, Green bristled at the fact that courts
said that proximate cause was a question for the jury, that courts
submitted the question to juries, and then, if they did not agree with the
juries' conclusion, they reversed them. He said:
62.
See, e.g., Hessiferv. So. Equip., Inc., 416 So. 2d 368, 373 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
63.
Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 839-41.
64.
See, e.g, Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1868); Johnsonv. Morehouse Gen.
Hosp., 2010-0387, pp. 43-44 (La. 5/10/11); 63 So. 3d 87, 116-17; Adamsv. Rhodia, Inc., 20072110, p. 13 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So. 2d798, 808.
65.
See, e.g, Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 839-40.
66.
For a rejection of the last cause argument in a FELA case, see CSX Transportation
Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. at 712 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
67.
See, e.g, Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 7 (1909);
Rossiter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 So. 2d 103, 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Hoover v.
Wagner, 189 So. 2d 20, 27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Kendall v. New Orleans Pub. Sewy., 45

So. 2d 541, 544 (La. App. Parish of Orleans 1950); Williams v. Pelican Creamery Inc., 30 So.
2d 574, 576-77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947); Cavarettav. Universal Film Exchs., 182 So. 135, 140
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
68.
See, e.g, Jacobs-Peterson v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1096-97 (D.
Utah 2016); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996).
69.
See, e.g, Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278
F. 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1921); Ardoin v. Williams, 108 So. 2d 817, 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959);
Terrillv. ICT Ins. Co., 93 So. 2d 292, 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Cruze v. Harvey & Jones,
134 So. 730, 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
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If the result obtained from erroneously leaving the fictitious "cause"
issue to the jury is palpably unjust, or if the result of leaving it to the jury
would probably be so, the appellate court declares as a matteroflaw that
there was in fact no causal relation issue to be left to the jury, and
proceeds to deal with it as an issue of causation for the court. Here they
make use of all those weighted phrases as "remote," "unforeseen,"
"intervening agencies," "independent agencies," and a score of others
which are meaningless as solvents except they provide a smoke screen
behind which the court can retire from an awkward position. They do
here under the guise of determining "proximate cause" what should have
been done by way of defining the scope of protection afforded by the rule
invoked.

Thus, the "law" of proximate cause was a sham. Judges were giving
the question to the jury but then taking it away if they disagreed with
the result.' Moreover, rather than explaining what was really going
on-a judicial decision-they resorted to magic words that shielded
the real process. 72 This ruse also shielded who was really decidingthe judge.
Green believed that the judge should determine the scope of
liability. That is evident in the last sentence quoted above. 73 Put
differently, he said judges "do not recognize that they have a function
to perform by way of defining the limits of the rule involved."74 Malone
agreed.7 ' Thus to Green and Malone, the scope of liability (or duty) was
a question for the judge.76 This is not inconsistent with Professor
Leiter's contention that the core claim of legal realism was that judges
were influenced by the facts, not legal rules. The realists believed that
judges decided based on facts, underlying biases, and their
backgrounds. 78 They did not decide merely because of doctrinal
compulsion. While critical of formalism and judicial hocus pocus, the
70.
71.
72.

GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77.

73. Id at 77 ("They do here under the guise of determining 'proximate cause' what
should have been done by way of defining the scope of protection afforded by the rule
invoked.").
74.
75.

Id at 76.
Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72; see Malone, Dixie Drive It, supranote

76.

Thus, aligning with Judge Cardozo's analysis in PalsgrafSee Palsgraf v. Long

5.
Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
77.
Leiter, supra note 58, at 275.

78.

See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on

the Bench: How JudgesDecide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); cf Tamanaha, supra

note 55, at 732 (describing the practicalities of realist judges).
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realists had an optimistic side, or at least some of them did. The realists
opined that once judges admitted what was going on and once they
relied upon principle and data, the law might develop more rationally
or at least more openly.79 Green hoped that perhaps then judges
admittedly and openly deciding scope of liability questions would
result in a more transparent and consistent law or field of negligence.
Importantly, in contending that judges should decide scope of
liability, Green and Malone did not distinguish between the scope
question in classes of cases or the scope question in particular cases. In
all instances, the judge decided the scope of liability. Malone noted his
view in one of his most famous articles, Ruminations on Cause-inFact:"
The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy
aspects is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it
arises. How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this controversy? This
is a question that the court cannot escape. 8
The scope of liability was omnipresent, and it was a decision for the
judge. The judge could not "escape" it.82 That is, the court cannot
escape the question (as some put it) whether the defendant owes a duty
to the plaintiff to protect against the risk that arose in the manner in
which it arose.83
But, how would the court determine the scope of the liability?
Green claimed that the scope of liability decision was based on several
policy factors: the administrative factor, the ethical or moral factor, the
economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor, and the justice
factor, including the capacity to bear the loss." And Green apparently
believed that basing proximate cause decisions on probability of harm,
or foreseeability, was improper." Asserting that tort liability was based
on public policy-not doctrine-was significant and remains the
mainstream view; I will return later to the practical and theoretical
realities of the application of policy to the particular facts of a garden-

79.
H.L.A. Hart, American JurisprudenceThrough English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 977-78 (1977).
80.
Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 73.
81.
Id
82.
Id
83.

See FRANKL. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., WiLLIAMR. CORBETT& JOHN

M. CHURCH, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 5.01, Lexis Advance (database updated Dec. 2019).
84.
See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.
85.
See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76.
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variety tort case. But first it is important to point out another key aspect
of the Green and Malone Duty/Risk analysis.
Green and Malone both talked about the "rule of law" on which
the plaintiff relied.8 6 The plaintiff supposedly pointed to a rule of law
that it claimed the defendant violated. The judge considered whether
that rule of law included the risk that injured the plaintiff. If so, the jury
would decide whether the defendant, in violating the so-called rule of
law, had failed to exercise reasonable care, i.e., had breached the
standard of reasonable care, and, if so, whether the breach was a factual
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Sometimes the rule of law might be
statutory and sometimes it might be "part of the fabric of the courtmade law of negligence.""
It is somewhat ironic that those who attacked formalism would
refer to "rules of law," especially those that were part of the fabric of
court-made negligence. Are these rules of law judge-made rules? The
idea of judge-made, conduct-based rules of law is reminiscent of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s notion that, as judges became
experienced, they would more freely take questions of breach from the
jury. One such judge-made rule or duty was Holmes' "stop, look, and
listen" rule." It was notably short-lived and ill-advised because
reasonable care varies with the facts of each case.8 9 Somewhat
ironically, it was Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the author of Palsgraf
who gently criticized and effectively buried Holmes' "stop, look, and
listen rule" only seven years after Holmes uttered it.90 In short there
was, once and for all, no set in stone "stop, look, and listen rule." 9
One is left with the idea that the "rules of law" to which Green
and Malone referred, at least when not based on statute, were not really
rules of law so much as the judge (and scholar) turning what the
plaintiff claimed was the defendant's alleged negligent act into a duty

86.
Id at 3-4; W. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 73; see also William L.
Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been
Influenced by Malone-aPrimer, 22 Loy. L. REv. 903, 906 (1976) (discussing rule of law in
the Duty/Risk analysis); Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk
Analysis, 44 LA. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (1984) (discussing rule of law in the Duty/Risk analysis).
87.
Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 73.
88.
See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 67-70 (1927).

89.

Pokom v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (rejecting the hard and fast

rule of Goodman).
90.
See id. at 99.
91.
Id at 105-06.
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or rule for the particular case.92 But generally, the defendant's duty is to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.9 3 The particular
alleged act of negligence is fact-based; it is not a rule of law.94 Certainly,
this is the case where no statute is involved. By way of example,
assume the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed to exercise
ordinary care by eating a bagel, drinking coffee, and driving at the same
time, resulting in the defendant hitting the plaintiff, a pedestrian,
because the defendant was distracted by his various ingestions. The
particular alleged act of negligence would morph into the "rule of law:"
thou shalt not eat a bagel and drink coffee and drive at the same time.
Of course, there really is no rule of law except the duty to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances. The bagel eating and coffee
drinking while driving are facts that allegedly rise to the level of a
breach. There is no rule and clearly no "law."
Returning to the orthodox Duty/Risk approach, the judge would
decide the scope of the rule of law (or scope of liability or duty). The
judge would decide whether the "rule of law" prohibiting a person from
eating a bagel, drinking coffee, and driving at the same time protected
the plaintiff/pedestrian from being injured when the defendant hit her
because he was distracted. Per Green and Malone, the judge would
make this decision based on "policy." 95
In any event, if the judge decided the "rule of law" included
protection from the risk that occurred, the jury or fact finder would still
have to decide whether the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care
when the defendant ate a bagel, drank coffee, and drove at the same
time. Was the particular alleged act of negligence (the so-called rule of
law), in fact, a breach of the standard of reasonable care? And the jury,
if it decided there was a breach, would then decide whether the breach
was a factual cause of the injuries (cause-in-fact) and, if needed,
damages. That was the theory of Duty/Risk. Now let us turn to the
Louisiana experience.
92. This discussion is very important in regard to the impact of Duty/Risk on breach,
but it is also essential here insofar as it is crucial to an understanding of the approach. Ironically,
by turning the particular alleged breach into a so-called rule of law, the realists obfuscated it.
They used a phrase-rule of law-which was a misnomer. They also thus empowered the
judge to hide behind that phrase as if he or she were making a judicial or legal decision, rather
than a fairness decision.
93.
Pontchartrain Nat. Gas Sys. v. Tex. Brine Co., 2018-0606, p. 8 (La. App. 1st Cir.
12/21/18); 268 So. 3d 1058, 1062 ("In negligence cases, there is an almost universal duty on

the part of a defendant to use reasonablecare to avoid injuring another.").
94.
95.

See id. at p. 8; 268 So. 3d at 1062-63.
See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64.
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IV. THE BIRTH OF DUTY/RISK LOUISIANA STYLE
This Part provides a brief review of the introduction of Duty/Risk
into Louisiana jurisprudence and its subsequent development. The
discussion is not intended to be encyclopedic but will attempt to set
forth the highlights in an evenhanded manner.
A.

Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American
Beverage Co.

The jurisprudential genesis of Duty/Risk in Louisiana is Dixie
Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co. 9 6
Dixie DriveIt Yourselfwas, at its heart, a garden-variety traffic accident
case. 97 Dixie had leased its truck to Gulf States Screw Products
Company.9 8 Langtre, a Gulf States employee, was driving the Dixie
truck southbound on Airline Highway.99 It was drizzling or misting.'o
The important thing to know about the truck lease was simply that
Langtre was not Dixie's employee; therefore, the law would not impute
Langtre's negligence to Dixie.'
As Langtre drove south, unbeknownst to him, an R C Cola truck,
owned by defendant American Beverage Company, had broken down
in the same lane in which Langtre was traveling.' 02 The breakdown
occurred eight to ten minutes before Langtre appeared on the scene.' 03
The driver of the R C Cola truck did not move the vehicle to provide
fifteen feet of unobstructed highway in violation of a statute.0 4 Nor did
the driver of the R C Cola truck display warning signals one hundred
feet behind and one hundred feet in front of the stalled vehicle.' This
failure was a violation of another statute. 0 6 Finally, the driver did not
take any action to warn approaching motorists of the stalled vehicle,
arguably in violation of common sense and the general duty to exercise
reasonable care.'

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962).
Id at 299-300.
d at 299.
Id
Id at 300.
Id at 301.
Id at 300.
Id
Id at 301-02 (quoting LA. R.S. § 32:241 (1951) (repealed)).
Id
Id (quoting LA. R.S. § 32:442 (1951) (repealed)).
Id at 301, 304.
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Predictably, Langtre did not notice the R C Cola truck until it was
too late to stop. 0 8 Langtre attempted to move into the left lane, but there
was another car in the left lane.109 Thus, Langtre jammed on his brakes
but could not avoid a collision."1 0 A lawsuit followed. The plaintiff,
Dixie, sought recovery for the damage to its truck."' The defendant
argued that the R C Cola truck driver was not negligent and that the
"sole cause" of the accident was Langtre's driving at an excessive rate
of speed given the conditions, failing to keep a proper lookout, and
failing to have his vehicle under sufficient control to avoid the
collision." 2 Even if Langtre's negligence could not be imputed to Dixie
because he was not their employee, his misconduct could still form the
basis of the "sole cause" defense." 3 The trial court held for the
defendant, and the court of appeal affirmed," concluding that although
the R C Cola driver violated the statutes requiring the placement of
warning signals and leaving fifteen unobstructed feet of roadway, his
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident." 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. It focused its analysis on
the signaling statute.11 6 It noted that the statute was a safety statute,
designed to protect "life and property on the highways.""' As such, the
court said the violation of the statute was "negligence per se"" 8 and
would be actionable if the violation "was a legal cause of the
collision."" Justice Sanders wrote:
108.
109.

Id. at 300.
Id

110. Id
111.

d at 299.

112. Id at 301. Interestingly, the so-called sole cause involved multiple alleged wrongs.
Id
113. Id at 301, 304. Another way to say it would be that Langtre's negligence was an
intervening cause, which rose to the level of a superseding cause. Id at 304.
114.

Mat301.

115. See Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 128 So.
2d 841, 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962) ("Whatever negligence

may have been involved on the part of the driver of the defendant vehicle had become passive
and too remote to be a contributing cause of the accident. The sole proximate cause thereof
was the negligence of the driver of the plaintiff truck. The defendant is not liable because the
negligence of its employee-driver was not a proximate cause of the accident.").
116.

Dixie Drive it Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302 ("We conclude that the driver violated

the statute by failing to display the red signal flags and to reasonably discharge his
responsibility to protect traffic.").
117.

Id

118. Id Today in Louisiana the procedural effect of violation of a statute in a negligence
case is probably only evidence of negligence and not negligence per se, but the idea that the
violation of a statute is relevant and possibly determinative in a case is still true.
119.

Id
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There is no universal formula for the determination of legal cause.
In the instant case it bifurcates into two distinct inquiries: whether the
negligence of the obstructing driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision;
and whether the defendants should be relieved of liability because of the
intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck.
It is clear that more than one legally responsible cause can, and
frequently does, contribute to a vehicular collision.' 20

The two quoted, short paragraphs are significant because they do
four things, all of which are consistent with the Green/Malone assault
on proximate cause. First, and notably, Justice Sanders used the phrase
"legal cause," rather than proximate cause, something, as noted, the
drafters of the first two Restatements also did.1 2 ' Second, he bifurcated
his legal cause analysis into its two separate parts: (1) cause-in-fact and
(2) scope of liability, i.e., whether to relieve the defendant from liability
because of the "intervening"l2 act of Langtre.' 23 While the use of the
word "intervening" is perhaps unfortunate given the intellectual history
described above, the essence of the second inquiry, albeit under the
guise of deciding whether to relieve the defendant of liability, is the
scope of liability for the violation of statute. Thus, the third significant
point-scope of liability-is a key inquiry in a negligence case. And
finally, Justice Sanders expressly stated that there can be more than one
legally responsible cause for an accident-thereby refuting the idea of
the "sole" proximate cause.12 4
Justice Sanders then turned to the analysis of cause-in-fact and
concluded that the violation of the statutes was a cause-in-fact of the
collision.' 25 Next, it was incumbent upon the court to determine the
scope of the liability-i.e., whether to relieve the defendant of
liability. 26 As noted, Justice Sanders expressly recognized that
"whether a defendant should be relieved of liability because of the
intervening negligence of another is frequently couched in terms of

120.

Id.

121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM LAW INST. 1965).

122.
123.

§9

(AM. LAW INST. 1934); RESTATEMENT

Dixie Drive it Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302.
Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 377 (1 suggest that Dixie's potential for

usefulness lies, not in any novelty that inheres in the decision, but rather in its insistence that
cause and legal duty be approached as separate matters and that the considemtions of policy be
libemted from the chrysallis of causation jargon and allowed to stand on their own footing.").
124.
125.
126.

Dixie Drive It Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302.
Id. at 302-04.
Id at 304.

LET THE JURY DECIDE!

2020]

787

proximate cause."l2 He then set forth the Louisiana Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the R C Cola driver's
negligence had become too passive and remote, thereby negating his
action as a proximate cause of the injury.' 28 In response to that
conclusion, Justice Sanders said: "The thrust of th[e Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal's] formulation of law is toward relieving all but the
last wrongdoer of liability to an innocent victim in torts involving
intervening negligence. This restrictive doctrine finds little support in
legal theory. We do not subscribe to the formulation as applied in this
case."l 2 9
Recognizing that the nub of the question was "whether the risk
and harm encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection
of the statute," 30 Justice Sanders then proceeded to consider the scope
of the statute. After citing and reviewing several cases and a student
note,' 3 ' Justice Sanders cited Leon Green's Rationale of Proximate
Cause and wrote:
The inattention or confusion of motor vehicle drivers is not a highly
extraordinary occurrence. The objective of the statutory provisions
violated in the instant case was to protect against the likelihood that an
oncoming motonst, whether cautious, confused or inattentive, would fail
to timely perceive the vehicle or that it was stationary and become
involved in an accident. The law was designed to protect the plaintiff
(and any member of its class) against such an accident as occurred in this
case. To deny recovery because of the plaintiff's exposure to the risk
from which it was the purpose of the law to protect him would nullify
the statutory duty and render its protection meaningless. The negligence
of the driver of the Dixie truck was responsive to that of the driver of the
R C Cola truck. It was dependent upon it. The negligence of the two
combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff.13 2
Thus, according to the court, the legislature had passed the statute in
question, intending it to protect from injury arising from both an
attentive and/or an inattentive driver colliding with a stopped vehicle.
Interpreting the statute otherwise-not to include the risk of the
127.

Id.

128. Id (quoting Dixie Drive It Yourself New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 128
So. 2d 841, 842 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962)).
129. Id (footnote omitted).
130. Id
131. Id at 304-05 (quoting Jesse D. McDonald, Comment, Proximate Cause in
Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 391, 396 (1956)).
132. Id at 305-06 (citing GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at
142-44).
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inattentive driver-would have rendered the statute meaningless, in
part. This the court refused to do. Duty/Risk was born in Louisiana.
To recap Dixie Drive it Yourself the court distanced itself from, if
not eschewed, the phrase "proximate cause." The court clearly
recognized that "cause" involved a factual inquiry-cause-in-factand a more nuanced issue: the scope of liability.'3 3 Or, as the court put
it, whether to relieve the defendant from liability. 34 The court,
following Green and Malone, decided the scope of liability question
itself and explained itself, rather than relying on the mumbo jumbo
magic words associated with proximate cause.' 35 And Justice Sanders
expressly stated that there can be more than one cause of any accident
and courts should not limit their consideration of the scope of liability
to the sequence of events or whether the defendant's negligence had
become "passive."136
Let us tarry for a few words over one aspect of the opinion: the
court's allocation of the scope of liability decision to itself That is, the
court decided scope of liability.' 37 Is that because scope of liability is
always a question for the court? Green' 38 and Malone39 would have
contended that is the case. But interestingly, Dixie Drive it Yourselfwas
not a jury trial.1 40 It was a trial to the court, so there was no express
reason to carefully consider decision-making responsibility. There is
another critical reason why the court might properly decide scope of
liability in a case like Dixie Drive it Yourself and not in every case.
That reason is that Dixie Drive it Yourselfwas not a garden-variety
negligence case; it was a case in which the plaintiff relied upon the
violation of a statute to establish that the defendant was negligent. 141
When a court considers whether to adopt a statute as the standard of
care in a negligence case, or to allow the jury to consider the violation
of a statute as evidence of the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable
care, it asks itself two questions:

133.
134.
135.

Id at 302, 304.
Id at 304.
See id. at 304-07.

136. Id at 304 (quoting Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Bevemge
Co., 128 So. 2d 841, 842 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962)).
137. See id. at 304-07.
138. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77.
139. See Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72-73.
140. See 137 So. 2d at 303.
141. Id at 300.
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Was the plaintiff a member of a class of persons whom the
legislature enacted the statute to protect?
Was the risk that occurred within the class of risks that the
legislature enacted the statute to guard against? 42

Answering those two questions requires the court to interpret the
statute.' 43 In deciding question one, the court is essentially determining
if the statute imposes an obligation on the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff.' And in answering the second question, the court is deciding
whether the statute imposes an obligation concerning the risk that arose
in the case."' The court is deciding the scope of liability. The court is
deciding whether, pursuant to the court's interpretation of the statute,
the defendant owes a duty to protect the plaintiff (Q1) from the risk
(Q2) that arose in the manner in which it arose.
The entire judicial exercise in a violation of statute case involves
the interpretation of a statute. Statutory interpretation is an inherently
judicial function, and answering questions one and two in a violation
of statute negligence case is appropriate for the court, as opposed to the
fact finder (jury). Judges and lawyers are trained to read and interpret
statutes. We go to law school for three years, and statutory
interpretation is one of the core activities in which we engage. Statutes
are often complicated and technical. It would be ludicrous to ask ajury
to initially 4 6 decide the meaning and scope of a statute."' Of course,
142.

See DOBBS ON TORTS, supranote 26,

§

148; see also Galligan,Primer, supra note

29, at 1520-21 (noting that proof of these issues canbe a presumption of negligence or evidence
of some negligence in other jurisdictions).
143.
144.
145.

Dixie Drive It Yourself 137 So. 2d at 304-06.
See id.
See id.

146. Of course, in ajurisdiction where the violation of a statute is not negligence per se,
the jury does have an opportunity to consider whether the violation of the statute was a violation
of the standard of reasonable care, but only after the judge has considered questions one and
two and determined that the jury can hear about and consider the statute. Put differently, the
court considers questions one and two to decide if the statute is relevant in the case before the
court. See also infra note 147 (discussing the difference between judge and jury functions in
Louisiana violation of statute cases).
147. The statement in text must be qualified somewhat. The broad interpretation of class
of persons is properly for the court. The broad interpretation of the class of risks is also
appropriately for the court. But it is arguable whether a judge is in a better position than a jury
to decide whether the scope of liability in aviolation of statute negligence case includes or does
not include the particular (and perhaps bizarre) manner in which the injury occurred. On this
question, the common sense of the community may be just as reliable as a judicial
determination of the scope of a statute, especially if the manner of occurrence was so
idiosyncratic that it is most probable the legislature never thought about it. Notably, some
courts include a proximate or legal cause element in their articulation of negligence in a
violation of statute case. See Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 592-96 (Tenn. Ct.
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that it is appropriate for a court to determine the scope of liability in a
violation of statute negligence case does not mean that it is appropriate
in every case. It does not mean it is appropriate for the court to consider
scope of liability in a case where there is no statute. 4 s
One last observation on Justice Sanders' opinion is appropriate,
and it relates to how a court decides the scope of liability. As noted
above, Green believed that courts should decide the scope of liability
based on several policy factors.1 4 9 Justice Sanders' analysis of the scope
of the statute at issue in Dixie Drive it Yourself does not appear to be
driven by those policies.so The decision is very appropriately based
upon Justice Sanders' interpretation of the statute.'' Critically, he
noted, holding that the statute did not cover the risk that occurred (a
wreck involving an inattentive driver) would have undermined the
purpose of the statute.' 5 2 Implicit in his decision is the notion that,
administratively, it is appropriate for the court to decide the scope and
reach of statutes (as I noted above).' 53 It is also implicit that the
legislature was no doubt concerned with encouraging operators of
broken-down cars to warn of the dangers associated with their stopped
vehicles.' 4 But Justice Sanders expressed none of that in his opinion;
there was no express policy discussion. Rather, there was a very
judicious discussion and interpretation of the relevant statute and its
scope.

App. 2003). The jury's role in determining the so-called scope of the statute would seem most
pronounced in ajurisdiction where the violation of statute is only some evidence of negligence,
like in Louisiana. Ducote v. Boleware, 2015-0764, p. 14 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/17/16); 216 So.
3d 934, 944; see Galligan, Primer, supra note 29, at 1509, 1520-21.

148. And in ajurisdiction like Louisiana, where the violation of a statute in a negligence
case is not negligence per se but is some evidence of negligence, the judge, in answering
questions one and two, is merely deciding whether the jury can even hear about the statute and
its alleged violation. Ducote, 2015-0764 at pp. 13-18; 216 So. 3d at 943-44. That is, the court

is merely deciding whether the statute is relevant in the tort case before it. See id. The jury
ultimately decides whether there has been a breach of the standard of reasonable care and
whether the scope of liability (risk) includes the injuries that occurred in the case before the
court.
149.
150.

GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.
Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 377.

151. See Dixie Drive it Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 137 So.
2d 298, 304-06 (La. 1962).
152. Id at 306.
153. See id. at 304.
154. See id. at 305-06.
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Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.

In the years after Dixie Drive it Yourself Louisiana's intermediate
appellate courts applied its Duty/Risk approach to cases arising under
statutes and to negligence cases where no statute was involved.'"' The
Louisiana Supreme Court would not clearly apply the Duty/Risk
method of analyzing negligence cases to a case where there was no
alleged statutory violation until ten years after Dixie Drive It Yourself
when it decided Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.' 56 In Hill, the court
considered a garden-variety negligence case in which there was no
claimed violation of a statute, and it applied the Duty/Risk analysis.'s
In the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy, Baton Rouge scurried to
repair itself before another storm hit.'"' Lundin & Associates was a
home repair contractor and, in doing post-Betsy work, created a
veritable assembly line of home repair.159 A Lundin crew and truck
would deliver materials and tools to ajob site. 60 Later, workers would
arrive by auto and do the required work.' 6 ' Thereafter, Lundin
personnel would pick up what was left at the site.' 6 2 Ms. Delouise hired
Lundin to make repairs to her home.'6 3 After Lundin made the repairs
to the Delouise home, it left a ladder leaning up against the side of the
house.' 6 4 At some point thereafter, some unknown person removed the
ladder from the side of the house and laid it in the Delouise yard.' 65
There it remained for several days,' 6 6 like the gun in Anton Chekhov's
first act.' 67
Celeste Hill worked as a housekeeper and babysitter for Ms.
Delouise.' 6 8 While on thejob, Ms. Hill went outside the Delouise home
to hang up the wash. 6 9 As she walked to the clothesline, she saw the
155. See Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 373-93.
156. 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
157. See id. at 621.
158. Id
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id
165. Id
166. Id
167. Ars. G., IZ" VOSPOM[NHI GB" A.P. CHEKHOVIE [Reminisces of A.P.
Checkhov], 28 Teatr i iskusstvo 520, 521 (1904) (Russ.) ("If in the first act you have hung a

pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don't put it there.").
168.
169.

Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621.
Id.
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ladder lying on the ground.'7 0 As she was hanging up the wash, she
heard the door slam and saw her youngest charge, who was two or three
years old, running toward her and the ladder."' Alarmed, she hurried to
save the child from falling over the ladder and in the process fell over
the very ladder from which she was trying to save the child, suffering
injury in the fall.' 72 The proverbial Chekhovian gun had fired.
Ms. Hill sued Ms. Delouise and Lundin, alleging negligence.' 7 3
The trial court held that Ms. Delouise was not at fault and, without
deciding whether Lundin was negligent, concluded that Hill was
contributorily negligent, and her recovery was thus barred under the
law at the time.' 4 The court of appeal reversed as to Lundin,
concluding it was negligent to leave a ladder at the site for several days
and that it was foreseeable someone could be injured by the ladder. It
also held that Ms. Hill was protected by the "momentary forgetfulness"
doctrine that vitiated what would otherwise have been contributory
negligence."
Lundin applied for writs, which the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted. 7 6 Justice Barham wrote the opinion for the court."' He began
his negligence analysis with cause-in-fact, concluding that Lundin's
leaving the ladder up against the side of the house was a cause-in-fact
of the injury."' Clearly and properly, the court was following the
Green/Malone prescription to treat cause-in-fact as a separate element
of negligence.179
Next, Justice Barham said "if the defendant's conduct of which
the plaintiff complains is a cause in fact of the harm, we are then
required in a determination of negligence to ascertain whether the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

178. Id at 622 ("If the defendant had not left the ladder on the premises, it could not
have later been placed on the ground in the yard. To this extent it may be said that the
defendant's act had something to do with the harm.").
179. Cf GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 186-95 (discussing issues with
causation); GREEN, RATIONALE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 132-41 (discussing
and distinguishing causation); Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1 (discussing cause-in-fact

as separate from proximate cause). Arguably, there was also a certain amount of logic to
starting the analysis with cause-in-fact because if there is no factual causation, then there is
really no need to go any further, but the same logic would not necessarily apply in a case tried
to ajury. Would the jury decide cause-in-fact before the judge decided duty?
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defendant breached a legal duty imposed to protect against the
particular risk involved."so As quoted, it is not entirely clear what
Justice Barham meant. Was he saying that after cause-in-fact the court
should decide breach? Or duty?
As he continued, it became clear that he meant that after cause-infact the court should consider the duty owed and its scope-scope of
liability or risk.'"' He said:
The basic question, then, is whether the risk of injury from a ladder lying
on the ground, produced by a combination of defendant's act and that of
a third party, is within the scope of protection of a rule of law which
would prohibit leaving a ladder leaning against the house. 82
Echoing Green's skepticism about relying on foreseeability to
determine proximate cause or scope of liability, Justice Barham opined
that foreseeability is "not always a reliable guide, and certainly it is not
the only criterion for determining whether there is a duty-risk
relationship."' 83 One notes that in articulating that foreseeability was
not the only factor in determining scope of liability, Justice Barham
actually used the phrase "duty-risk."'
But what else besides
foreseeability did Justice Barham see as relevant to the scope of
liability determination? "The ease of association of the injury with the
rule relied upon, however, is always a proper inquiry."'s The phrase
"ease of association" is downright literary. It is evocative. What it
means is less clear. Over the years, I have come to realize that it means
that the court, in determining scope of liability, should consider how
easily one would associate the risk, which arose, with the particular
alleged negligent act.' 86 That is, if the defendant was negligent-i.e.,
allegedly breached the duty to exercise reasonable care-to leave a
180. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622. Interestingly, he cited two articles by Leon Green in
addition to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision. See id. at 548; Leon Green, Duties, Risks,
Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962); Leon Green, The CausalRelation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962).

181. Most accumtely, he did discuss breach but did not decide the question; he assumed
that leaving a ladder leaning up against the side of a house might, under some circumstances,
pose an unreasonable risk of harm. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id
Id
Id
Id After this sentence Justice Barham cites WLLIAMPROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW OF TORTS 282ff (3d ed. 1964), but the phrase does not appear in Prosser. One of the
footnotes on the cited page is a laudable reference to Leon Green and his notion that the real
issue of proximate cause is a legal issue based on policy. Id 282 n2 (citing Leon Green,
Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 621, 755 (1950)).

186. The so-called "rule of law."
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ladder leaning up against the side of a house; would a
housekeeper/babysitter falling over the ladder after a third party had
moved the ladder be one of the risks that come to mind?'
What, in addition to ease of association, should the court consider
in deciding scope of liability or scope of duty?
Where the rule of law upon which a plaintiff relies for imposing a duty
is based upon a statute, the court attempts to interpret legislative intent as
to the risk contemplated by the legal duty, which is often a resort to the
court's own judgment of the scope of protection intended by the
Legislature. Where the rule of law is jurisprudential and the court is
without the aid of legislative intent, the process of determinmig the risk
encompassed within the rule of law is nevertheless similar. The same
policy considerations which would motivate a legislative body to impose
duties to protect from certain risks are applied by the court in making its
determination.'s
The paragraph merits some breaking down. Initially, in the first
sentence, Justice Barham analogizes the garden-variety negligence
case to the violation of statute negligence case.18 9 In a violation of
statute case the court asks questions one and two about class of persons
and class of risks. Per Justice Barham, in a garden-variety case where
the issue involves a jurisprudential "rule of law" the process is the
same.' 90 But, as noted above the idea of a jurisprudential rule of law is
somewhat misleading because really what it translates to is the
particular factual negligence the plaintiff alleged.' 9' Be that as it may,
the court then, per Green, Malone, and Hill, should turn the plaintiff's
particular alleged negligent act into a "rule of law" and decide whether
that "rule of law" includes the risk that occurred in the case. I tell my
class it is a sort of "write your own statute" exercise.
Clearly, per Barham, Green, and Malone, once the hypothetical
statute or rule of law is hypothetically enacted (by the court?), then the
judge decides the scope of liability in light of the relevant policies.' 92
While Justice Barham does not expressly list these policies, one might
intuit that they are the same policies Green articulated as relevant to the
scope of liability decision: the administrative factor, the ethical or
moral factor, the economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor,
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Of course, foreseeability might well sneak into this inquiry.
Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622-23 (citations omitted).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
See, e.g., Pokorav. WabashRy. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934).
See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 623.
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and the justice factor, including the capacity to bear the loss.' 93 So then,
what did the Hill court decide?
This defendant's alleged misconduct, its alleged breach of duty,
was in leaving the ladder leaning against the house unattended. The risk
encountered by the plaintiff which caused her harm was the ladder lying
on the ground where it was placed by another, over which she tripped as
she moved to protect the child. The record is devoid of any evidence
tending to establish that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated
that a third person would move the ladder and put it in the position which
created this risk, or that such a "naked possibility" was an unreasonable
risk of harm.
A rule of law which would impose a duty upon one not to leave a
ladder standing against a house does not encompass the risk here
encountered. We are of the opinion that the defendant was under no duty
to protect this plaintiff from the risk which gave rise to her injuries. The
plaintiff has failed to establish legal and actionable negligence on the part
of the defendant.1 9 4
First, one is struck by the fact that the core of the decision seems to be
that there was no evidence that the defendant could have anticipated
someone moving the ladder and placing it in the plaintiff's ultimate
path.1 9 5 Of course, "anticipated" is a synonym for foreseeable.
Ironically, Justice Barham had earlier pointed out that foreseeability
was not always a reliable guide to determine scope of liability.1 96
Apparently, foreseeability was a sufficiently reliable guide for the
decision in Hill. Second, a critic might also lament that the court did
not undertake to meaningfully apply or explain the ease of association
inquiry after introducing it. 19 The court might have indicated that one
would associate the risk of someone, perhaps a child, falling off a
ladder left leaning up against the side of a house, but not so much a
phantom moving the ladder and someone tripping over it. Third, after
noting that the determination of scope of liability involved a policy
193.

See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. One commentator,

McNamara, lists the following: "(1) ease of association, (2) administrative considemtions,
(3) economic considerations, (4) moral considemtions, (5) type of activity, and (6) precedent
or historical considemtions." Supra note 86, at 1234.
194. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Lanza Enters., Inc. v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d 91, 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961)).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 622.
197. Cf Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104, 107 (La. 1974) ("Particularly included within

the risk of harm to others is the fact that, with the expectation of child group play, an easily
associated risk is that some other incompetent, by reason of tender age, would misbehave or
would misuse the gasoline.").
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analysis, there is absolutely no policy analysis. Perhaps the lack of
policy discussion or analysis is inevitable in a garden-variety
negligence case, but if so, there are implications for the contention that
the judge, rather than the fact finder, should decide scope of liability in
a garden-variety negligence case. I will discuss these implications
below. Fourth, whether the scope of liability would, in fact, always be
a legal issue for the court, as Green and Malone contended,' 98 was not
crystal clear because, like Dixie Drive It Yourself Hill was not a jury
case.' 99 It was tried by the court.
Happily, the court maintained the separation of cause-in-fact from
scope of liability.2 00 And happily, the court did not resort to the mumbo
jumbo words of proximate cause. For instance, Justice Barham did not
say that Lundin leaving the ladder against the side of the house was not
the proximate cause of Hill's injury because whoever moved the ladder
and laid it down was an intervening cause, which rose to the level of a
superseding cause, which broke the chain of causation.20 ' Nor did the
court rely upon the sequence of events or say that Lundin's negligence
was "passive" or that the negligence of whomever moved the ladder
was the "sole" proximate cause of Hill's injuries.
The analysis in Hill ended at the scope of duty or liability stage
because there was no need to proceed.202 But what if Justice Barham
had concluded that the defendant's duty did include the risk that
occurred? Then, presumably, the fact finder would have had to decide
whether Lundin had breached the appropriate standard of care-had
Lundin behaved unreasonably under the circumstances? Put
differently, was there, or should there be, a "rule of law" that one should
not leave a ladder leaning up against the side of a house?203 And, lastly,
if the fact finders decided there was a breach, they would decide the
damages issue.
We may chart the allocation of decision-making authority in a
negligence case under Duty/Risk after Hill as follows:

198. See, e.g., GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77;
Malone, Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72.
199. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621.
200. See id. at 622.
201. Id. at 622-23.
202. Id at 623.

203. Louisiana courts have had a tendency since Hill to conflate duty and breach. See,
e.g, Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, pp. 9-22 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 590-

96. That unfortunate tendency deserves fuller and separate treatment.
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Who Decides
Jury
Judge
Jury
Jury

With the decision in Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Duty/Risk was
enshrined as "the" Louisiana approach to negligence, whether the case
involved a violation of a statute or not. Under the Duty/Risk approach,
cause-in-fact and scope of liability were separated. The judge would or
should consider the relevant policies in making the Duty/Risk decision.
And courts would concomitantly avoid the mumbo jumbo magic word
approach to negligence that characterized the pre-Green/Malone
approach to and analysis of negligence. Except perhaps for having the
judge decide scope of liability, the future seemed bright.204
Sadly, the next Part will blunt the optimism Hill portended. It will
discuss the post-Hill development of negligence analysis in Louisiana,
the lack of policy analysis in most garden-variety negligence cases, and
the inconsistency that has ensued. As noted, I once praised this
inconsistency as "flexibility."2 05 I was wrong. Dave Robertson, who
urged a more consistent approach with the jury deciding scope of
liability, was right.206 Now I am convinced. The consistent analytical,
policy-based, transparent approach to negligence that Hill
foreshadowed never materialized. And judges are not the appropriate
institutional actor to decide scope of liability in a garden-variety factspecific negligence case; juries are. Or in a non-jury trial-an
increasingly common phenomenon-the judge should decide scope of
liability, but as a mixed question of fact and law, not as a question of
law. This point is crucial when a defendant moves for summary
judgment20 7 contending that the defendant's duty did not include the
risk that occurred.

204. And there are still cases applying the Hill formula and its allocation of decisionmaking responsibility. See, e.g., Pardue v. AT&T Tel. Co., 2001-0762, pp. 2-5 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 10/3 1/0 1); 799 So. 2d 710, 712-14.
205. Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 20, at 35; Galligan, Revisiting the Patterns
ofNegligence, supra note 20, at 1132.
206. See, e.g., Robertson, AllocatingAuthority, supra note 19, at 1102-05. Or, in a case

with no july, the judge as fact finder should decide scope of liability. But that decision is not
law; it is a mixed question of fact and law with no precedential value.
207.

FED. R. CIv. P. 56; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art. 966 (2020).
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If scope of liability is properly a mixed question of fact and law,
then judges should not grant summary judgment if there are material
facts concerning the scope of the defendant's liability (or duty) and
reasonable minds could find that the indicated risk was within the scope
of liability as a basic question of fairness or common sense.2 08 The court
should not turn the scope of liability determination into a question of
law at the summary judgment phase and either ignore or decide critical
factual issues. Doing so misallocates decision-making authority and
creates what looks like legal decisions that litter and confuse the
landscape of Louisiana tort law. If there are factual209 issues concerning
the scope of liability, the question is not appropriate for resolution at
the summary judgment stage. If there are no factual questions, the court
should grant summary judgment on the scope of liability question, not
the duty question.
V.

DUTY/RISK DERAILED

The purpose of this Part is not to exhaustively review post-Hill v.
Lundin & Associates, Inc. negligence law in Louisiana. Rather, it is to
point out broad trends and to point out how the Duty/Risk method of
analysis has not, in some ways, fulfilled its promise. In this Part, I show
that courts have not consistently articulated policy bases of their
decisions when deciding scope of liability or scope of duty.210 The
failure to analyze and discuss policy in such cases is because the results
in garden-variety negligence cases generally turn on case-specific
fairness, not policy. Thus, fact finders, not judges, are the appropriate
institutional actors to determine scope of liability or risk.
A.

The Promise ofFact-SpecificPolicyAnalyses Was Illusory

Green and Malone contended that courts deciding scope of
liability or scope of duty had to make a policy choice about the scope
of the "rule" upon which the plaintiff relied.2 1 ' As noted above, Green
articulated the relevant policies: the administrative factor, the ethical or
moral factor, the economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor,
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art 966(A)(3).
209. Including mixed questions of fact and law.
210. The Louisiana Supreme Court has said that it would make tort decision "in light of
all [the] relevant moral, economic, and social considerations," Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d
1146, 1147 (La. 1983) (determining whether something posed an unreasonable risk of hann),
and sometimes, but certainly not always, did not apply those factors.
211. See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64.
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and the justice factor, including the capacity to bear the loss.2 12 There
are several excellent Louisiana Supreme Court opinions discussing
these general tort policies, and some of these cases are discussed below
in the proposal Part. However, it is important to note that those
Louisiana decisions, for the most part, involve cases and rules dealing
with "whole categories of claimants or . .. claims,"213 not cases dealing
with discrete, isolated allegations of negligent conduct.
In cases involving more discrete, less categorical claims, it is not
uncommon to see little or no analysis of the policies Green identified
as critical. I have come to believe this is inevitable as grand policy often
has little or no role to play at the fact-specific level of determining
whether it is fair to hold someone liable for injuries they have factually
caused. For instance, in Jones v. Robbins, the defendant sold or gave a
small amount of gasoline to a six-year-old child.2 14 A group of children,
including the direct recipient of the gas, played with the gasoline,
pretending to have paint on their hands and washing their hands with
the gasoline.2 15 About one and one-half hours after the six-year-old
obtained the gas, her four-year-old half-sister, with a match in hand,
came upon the scene of the playing children.216 The four-year-old
struck the match, threw it into the gasoline, was subsequently engulfed
in flames, and suffered injury.217 Her father sued the owner and
manager of the store where the six-year-old had obtained the gas.218
The trial court held for the defendants and the court of appeal
affirmed.21 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.220
In Jones, Justice Barham, the author of Hill, again began the
analysis with cause-in-fact, concluding that the defendant was a causein-fact of the plaintiff's injuries.22 ' Then, he turned to duty, breach, and
scope of duty.222 On the duty and breach questions he said:
As a general statement, it may be said that the vendor of gasoline has the
duty not to place it in the hands of those who, by reason of age or other
212.
213.
(La. 1996)
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.
Pite v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 1 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596
(Lennon, J., concurring).
289 So. 2d 104, 106 (La. 1974).
Id
Id
Id
Id at 105-06.
Id at 108.
Id
Id at 106.
Id at 106-08.
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disabilities, are unaware of the special propensities of the material, and
ofthe precautionary measures which must be taken when using or storing
it. Under the particular facts of this case, when a six year old child comes
alone to a service station attendant and procures gasoline, without any
adult solicitation or any adult supervision, it may be said that the
attendant has breached a duty imposed by a standard of care owed to at
least the one to whom he has dispensed the gasoline. 22 3
Turning to scope of duty, Justice Barham asked whether the duty not to
provide gasoline to a six-year-old child encompassed the risk her fouryear-old half-sister would suffer burn injuries. 224
The court concluded that the duty not to provide gasoline to an
underage person included the risk that had occurred in the case.225
Why? Because children play together, and thus the risk of injury from
fire was easily associated with the duty.226 Moreover, while he did not
use the word, he essentially concluded that the occurrence was
foreseeable.22 7 What policy analysis was there?
The duty not to place gasoline in the hands of an unsupervised
incompetent six year old was designed not only to protect that child, but
also to protect those whom she would likely expose to the danger of the
highly flammable substance. Moreover, it included the risk that another
incompetent of tender age might engage in an activity of misuse which
would actually ignite the gasoline and create the harm which the four
year old Candy here suffered.228
The opinion does not expressly consider any of the policies which
Green contended should be at the heart of the scope of duty analysis. 22 9
Arguably, the opinion hints at notions of deterrence-the law should
deter adults from providing dangerous substances to children_230 but
the opinion did not expressly articulate or apply any of Green's
223. Id. at 107. Interestingly, he analyzed duty and breachbefore scope of duty; whereas
in Hill he conflated the duty and scope of duty questions. See Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., 256
So. 2d 620, 622-23 (La. 1972). Thus, in Jones he essentially switched the order of analysis,
which phenomenon I will discuss below.
224. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107-08.
225. Id at 108.
226. Id at 107.
227. Id at 107-08 (holding that the risk was "totally within the range of the attendant's
realization of the consequences of his act").
228. Id at 108. Interestingly, the dissent relies on pre-Greenian proximate cause
concepts like "shifting the responsibility" to the mother of the child and the passage of time
between the provision of the gas and the bum injuries. Id at 108-10 (Summers, J., dissenting).
229. For a poetic take on Jones, see Thomas E. Richard, Jones v. Robbins: The Rhyme
andReason ofDuty-Risk, 74 LA. L. REv. 839 (2014).
230. See Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107-08.
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policies. Nor does it plumb in-depth policies related to who should be
responsible for supervision and oversight of children, although an
analysis of that issue would once again seem to turn on the particular
facts of the particular case before the court.
Likewise, in Gresham v. Davenport, a fifteen-year-old girl, who
lived with her father, hosted a party at her father's house.23 ' At the party,
she served beer to her guests, including her sixteen-year-old
boyfriend.232 Neither young person was a "novice to beer drinking." 23 3
Over the course of the evening, the young man drank ten beers.234 On
the way home, the boyfriend, who was not driving, grabbed the wheel
of the car in which he was traveling in order to avoid hitting some
mailboxes. 235 Consequently, the driver lost control of the car.23 6 The
driver was killed and two other passengers suffered serious injuries in
the ensuing collision. 2 37 The parents of two of the victims sued the girl's
father and his insurers, among others.23 8
One of the questions the court considered was whether the girl
owed a duty not to serve beer to her boyfriend. 239 The court doubted
that the girl had a duty not to serve beer to her boyfriend. 24 0 But, even
if a duty was owed:
the particular risk encountered by serving beer to [the boyfriend], a
passenger in a vehicle, that he would grab the steering wheel and cause
an accident cannot be easily associated with [the girlfriend's] conduct in
providing the beer. Moreover, there is no indication that such a risk was
within the legislative intent in passing the statute prohibiting a minor
from purchasing alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the particular risk was
not within the scope of whatever duty that [the girlfriend], a minor
herself, might have owed to [her boyfriend].241
That is the extent of the analysis. There was no ease of association
between any duty owed and the risk that occurred; what happened was
apparently just too bizarre.242 But that does not seem like a legal

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

537 So. 2d 1144, 1144 (La. 1989).
Id at 1144-45
Id at 1147.
Id at 1145-46.
d at 1145.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 1147.
Id
Id at 1147-48.
See id.
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determination. It seems like a mixed question of law and fact and is
totally fact-specific.243 Once again, the opinion, when considering
scope of the duty, does not undertake or express any analysis of policy
at all.
Roberts v. Benoit,244 particularly on rehearing, exemplified the
same trend of little or no analysis of the core policies of tort law. Benoit
was a cook working for the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office.2 45 The
Sheriff commissioned the kitchen workers as deputy sheriffs in order
to make them eligible for state supplemental pay.2 4 6 Before
commissioning the workers, the sheriff provided a training course,
which included eight hours of firearms training.2 47 During the training,
the instructor told the future (kitchen-based) deputies "that while off
duty, it was better to have a gun and not need it than to need a gun and
not have it."2 48 The instructors also provided the prospective deputies
with departmental regulations that they should not have a gun on their
person when consuming alcohol.2 49
After commissioning, Benoit, who had been drinking, went to
Roberts' home to have Roberts repair his car. While at Roberts' home,
Benoit took a .38 revolver out of its holster and began playing with it
for a forty-five-minute period, including cocking and uncocking the
gun.250 Roberts asked Benoit to put the gun away several times. Benoit
did not comply.2 5' Thereafter, the revolver discharged, seriously
injuring Roberts.25 2 Roberts sued Benoit, the Sheriff, and others.253
The case involved issues of potential vicarious liability and
negligent hiring, commissioning, and training.254 It wound its way up
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.255 The court, in its first opinion by
243. And if one focused on the broad risks of drunken underage children doing all
manner of stupid and dangerous things, perhaps the general risk of tragic mayhem includes the
particular, bizarre behavior of grabbing a steering wheel. I would leave that up to lawyers to
argue and juries to decide, and each case would stand on its own facts.
244. 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992).
245. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. 1991), on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1032
(La. 1992).
246. Id.
247. Id
248. Id
249. Id Apparently, it was better to not have a gun when one needed it if one had been
drinking than to have a gun when one needed it if one had been drinking.
250. Id at 1035-36.
251. Id at 1036.
252. Id
253. Id at 1035.
254. Id at 1036.
255. Id
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Justice Hall, considered the law related to negligent hiring in other
jurisdictions and expressly recognized the tort of negligent hiring in
Louisiana.2 56 But, was the risk, which occurred, within the scope of the
duty? Echoing Green, Justice Hall said:
There is no "rule" for determining the scope of the duty. Regardless if
stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the
duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular
risk falls within the scope of the duty.... These cases require logic,
reasoning and policy decisions be employed to determine whether
liability should be imposed under the particular factual circumstances
presented.25 7
Justice Hall then stated that the court found that the ease of
association between the duty to properly train deputies and the injuries,
which occurred, and the manner in which they occurred was
"attenuated."2 58 There was no requirement that Benoit carry a firearm
even if it was encouraged; Benoit's carrying the gun while drinking
violated the Sheriff's regulations; and Benoit's engaging in horseplay
with the revolver, while intoxicated, violated common sense.259 Nor
was there anything in Benoit's background or experience to predict
what occurred; thus, the incident was not foreseeable to the Sheriff.260
Moreover, Benoit met Roberts in a purely personal capacity; it was not
related to his employment.261 Justice Hall concluded his analysis by
saying:
After carefully delineating the duty, it is evident that the primary purpose
for imposing the duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring,
commissioning and training deputies is to ensure effective and efficient
law enforcement, and also to protect the public from injury caused by a
deputy's negligent use of firearms while engaged in his law enforcement
duties. The risk that a deputy while off duty and under no requirement to
carry a gun would engage in horseplay with a loaded revolver while
intoxicated, an action in violation of the Sheriff's regulations, and cause
injury to plaintiff is clearly outside the ambit of protection contemplated
by the imposition of that duty.262

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 1038-40, 1043-44.
at 1044-45.
at 1045.

at 1046.
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The quote reveals a concern for deterrence-to deter the police from
negligent use of firearms when engaged in law enforcement
activities. 63 The rest of the analysis described above is common sense
logic, not policy.2 64 And the decision was fact-dependent: the fact the
Sheriff did not require Benoit to carry a gun; the fact Benoit violated a
regulation by carrying a firearm when intoxicated; the stupidity of
playing with a loaded gun while drunk; and the lack of foreseeability
are unique to the case.2 65
There were three spirited dissents from the court's first opinion in
Roberts, and the court granted rehearing.2 6 6 On rehearing, Justice Cole
wrote the opinion of the court.2 67 Justice Cole began as a true believer
in Duty/Risk, noting:
Defining legal or proximate cause has proved to be a herculean task for
the judiciary in all places and all times. The very term "proximate cause"
is fraught with confusion, as it has nothing to do either with cause or
proximity. Moreover, it is not to be mistaken for cause-in-fact, as the two
elements satisfy entirely different functions in the negligence analysis. 2 68

Then, after a historical discussion of proximate cause and Duty/Risk,2 69
Justice Cole turned to the case before the court and said:
In our original opinion we stated the sheriff has a duty to commission as
deputies only competent law enforcement officers. Upon
reconsideration, we find that the duty implicated by this case is actually
much narrower, viz., the duty not to promote a cook to deputy in name
alone, that is, not to engage in ersatz promotions.270

The purpose of that duty was not to protect against personal injury but
to protect the public fisc. 27 1 Interestingly, as Justice Cole continued, he
began to shift terms and call the scope of duty issue a "legal cause"
issue.

272

In subsequently defining the issue and denying recovery, Justice
Cole wrote:

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id.
See id.
See id
See id at 1046-50.
Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1050 (La. 1992).
Id at 1052.
Id at 1052-54.
Id at 1054.
Id
Id
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In this case, the inquiry becomes whether the duty not to promote a cook
to deputy, in name only, is meant to protect the class of claimants, of
which plaintiff is a member, from the risk that the cook will: acquire, of
his own accord, the trappings of a deputy; while off-duty, become
intoxicated; play games with his loaded gun; and, in the process,
inadvertently shoot someone. We do not think the duty encompasses
such a far-flung hazard, dependent as it is on the unpredictable and
idiosyncratic foibles of one person. While it is not necessary that the
exact risk encountered be foreseeable, it is unrealistic to expect the
sheriff, who promoted Benoit simply to put him on the supplemental pay
rolls, could have expected any harm to result from this maneuver. The
facts indicate that what little training Benoit received, he received as a
matter of form alone.273

The reader will note how incredibly fact specifically Justice Cole
articulated the scope of duty or legal cause (Duty/Risk) question. 274 The
reader will also notice that the ultimate basis for the no liability
determination was that the incident, as it occurred, was
unforeseeable.27 5 Continuing, Justice Cole emphasized the "factintensive nature of the duty-risk analysis." 276 The opinion, whether one
agrees with the result or not, is a fine example of traditional legal
reasoning. Justice Cole, as Justice Hall had done in the original opinion,
reviewed the jurisprudence and attempted to garner and hone the reach
of the duty to train. But there is a noteworthy absence of any express
analysis of "policy" as Green defined it.
In Cay v. State Department of Transportation& Development, a

man, wearing black, who had been drinking, and who was walking on
a bridge with traffic at his back at night, fell to his death.2 77 His
survivors sued the state, claiming that the state breached its duty to
exercise reasonable care because it had not designed the height of the
bridge guardrail to the height required by law for bridges on which
pedestrians traveled.2 78 While there were no witnesses to the fall and no
signs a vehicle had hit decedent, the most plausible inferences were that
a car coming up behind him had scared him and that, in an intoxicated
state, he had staggered and fallen over the low guardrail.27 9

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id at 1054-55.
See id.
See id.
Id at 1055.
93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393, 394.
Id at 395.
Id at 397.
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In a careful and typically clear opinion, Justice Lemmon
considered, among other issues, the scope of duty issue. He discussed
the general risk at issue and concluded: "There is an ease of association
between an accidental fall over the railing of a bridge and the failure to
build the railing to a height above an average person's center of
gravity."28 The opinion is sensible and unassailable, but, once again,
there is no discussion of Greenian policy. Interestingly, the court did
reallocate fault from 60% to the defendant and 40% to the decedent to
10% to the defendant and 90% to the decedent.2 8 ' Thus, the opinion is,
in part, about the role of liability, victim fault, and the impact of
comparative negligence after its adoption.2 82
In the twenty-five years since these decisions, the courts continue
to state that the scope of duty question is fact-specific and, at the same
time, that it is a policy decision.283 But the courts, in deciding the scope
280.
281.

Id. at 399.
Id

282. That is, rather than find no liability to an at fault victim through the Duty/Risk
method, the court found liability but allocated the lion's share of the fault to the decedent.
283. See, e.g., Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2008-1163, 2008-1169, pp. 38-40 (La.
5/22/09); 16 So. 3d 1065, 1092-93; Chaissonv. Avondale Indus., Inc., 2005-1511, pp. 24-26
(La. App. 4th Cir. 12/20/06); 947 So.2d 171, 188-89; Conerly v. State ex rel. La. State
Penitentiary, 2002-1852, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03); 858 So. 2d636,646-47; Perkins
v. Entergy Corp., 98-2081, 98-2082, 98-2083, pp. 30-35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/99); 756 So.
2d 388, 409-13; Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Tr. Co., 99-12, pp. 13-22 (La.

App. 3d Cir. 7/21/99); 738 So. 2d 172, 181-86 (discussing thoroughly jurisprudence, the facts,
and logic but without a "Greenian" policy analysis); Nicholson v. Calcasieu Par. Police Jury,
96-314, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So. 2d 507, 511-12; Rhodes v. State ex rel.
Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 94-1758, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/96); 684 So. 2d 1134,
1144; Freemanv. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 95-0243, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/26/95); 663
So. 2d 515, 518-19 (foreseeability); cf Cormierv. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 98-2208, p. 9 (La. 9/8/99);

745 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (noting that liability on the state would create too onerous a burden); Phillips
v. G & H Seed Co., 2010-1405, p. 12 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/11/11); 66 So. 3d 507, 515 (quoting
FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAs C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW 132-33 (1996))

(noting the policies at issue in an economic harm negligence case). Sometimes the court has
taken a more middle of the road approach between a fact-specific inquiry and a policy analysis.
For instance, in Maw EnterprisesLLC v. City of Marksville, the court considered whether a

city's duty to provide a retail alcohol beverage permit to a qualified applicant encompassed the
risk that the applicant's lessor would suffer economic loss if the city improperly denied the
lessee-applicant a permit and thereby harmed the business. 2014-0090, p. 2 (La. 9/3/14); 149
So. 3d 210, 212-13. After first considering whether the city had a duty under the applicable
state alcohol laws, the court considered whether the city had a duty under LA. CIV. CODE art.
2315 (2020). Id at p. 11-19, 149 So. 3d at 217-22. In holding the duty did not encompass the

risk, the court phrased the duty and scope of duty question in a fact-specific manner. Id. at p.
17, 149 So. 3d at 221. In concluding there was not liability, the court noted the case-specific
facts but also referred generally to "momal, social, and economic values." Id at p. 18, 149 So.
3d at 221-22. Then, it rather summarily uttered concerns about unlimited liability to an
unlimited number and articulated hypothetical concerns about liability for employees losing
theirjobs and damage to suppliers. Id at p. 18-19, 149 So. 3d at 222 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc.
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of the duty or risk, do not typically discuss the administration ofjustice
or the judicial role, the ethical or moral factor-other than a pure sense
of fairness, deterrence, or the capacity to bear the loss.284 A 2017
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision evincing this
28 5
reality is Chanthasalov. Deshotel.
Deshotel rear-ended Chanthasalo on the interstate; the parties
subsequently pulled over to inspect the damage and to report the
v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984)). It then referred to its "policy" decision

in the case. Id. Notably, there was no empirical evidence offered for the court's economic
concerns. See id.
284.

See, e.g, Cleco Co.v. Johnson, 2001-0175, p.7 (La. 9/18/01); 795 So. 2d 302, 307

("If it is foreseeable that damage to electrical lines could cause a power outage and a resulting
automobile accident, a trier of fact may conclude that it is foreseeable that such damage could
cause a power surge which would harm electrical customers' equipment."); Carpenter v.
Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 47,008, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/29/12); 87 So. 3d 264, 269

(holding that interruption of water service was not the legal cause of fire damage three days
later); Bruno v. Davis, 2009-928, p. 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2/24/10); 31 So. 3d 633, 635

("Although the exact manner in which Plaintiff came to harm may not have been foreseeable,
it was, and is obvious that an elderly person lying quietly in bed might be suddenly confused
and disoriented by a vehicle crashing into her house. The particular harm whichbefell Plaintiff,
while unusual, can be reasonably said to be associated with the sudden event caused by the
chain of events that resulted from Richard Davis' negligence in opemting his vehicle.");
Stephenson v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ins. Co., 2004-1237, pp. 8-10 (La. App. 3d Cir.

2/2/05); 893 So.2d 180, 186-87 (holding that any duty a school and its soccer coach owed to
prevent a player from participating in a soccer match because of left ankle injury, which was
properly braced, did not include the risk that the player would sustain injury to her right leg
because of an unsuccessful maneuver by an opposing player); Franz v. LeDoux, 2003-2080,
p. 5 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/4/04); 869 So. 2d 137, 140-41 (holding that there was no ease of

association between a fall from a piece of exercise equipment and a motor vehicle accident one
month later); Pardue v. AT&T Tel. Co., 2001-0762, p. 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/31/01); 799 So.
2d 710, 713-14 (quoting Todd v. State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 96-3090, p. 7 (La. 9/9/97);

699 So. 2d 35, 39) (holding that there is no ease of association between alleged negligent
maintenance of a power line and a squirrel gaining access to a transformer casing a power
outage which damages plaintiff's cordless phone); Barr v. Jacobson, 34,975, p. 5 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 9/28/01); 795 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (holding that the danger of stepping into holes located off
of the roadway while embarking ona second trip to observe othervehicles or persons involved,
out of curiosity or personal interest, six or seven minutes after the accident, is simply not within
the scope of this duty).
285.

2017-0521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So. 3d 1103; see also Cleco, 2001-

0 175, p. 7; 795 So. 2d at 307 (holding that a dump truck driver's duty to not negligently back
into a utility pole included the risk that customers of the utility would suffer damage to their
electrical appliances as the result of a power surge by relying upon foreseeability and case
analysis with no discussion of policy); LeBlanc v. Stevenson, 2000-0157, p. 5 (La. 10/17/00);

770 So. 2d 766, 771 (detailing a sad tale of two men trying to get a truck out of the mud, an
amputated finger, and no discussion of policy); Todd, 96-3090 at p. 17; 699 So. 2d at 43-44
(relying upon foreseeability in concluding that the risk an eleven-year-old boy would commit
suicide at his father's house after being removed from his mother by the Department of Social
Services during an investigation into child abuse initiated by teachers of the decedent who saw
bruises on him was not within the scope of the State's duty to conduct an investigation of the
matter).
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accident to the police.28 6 Approximately five to fifteen minutes later,
another party rear-ended another car as they passed by the site of the
initial accident.287 Those two cars then struck both Chanthasalo and
Deshotel.28 8 Chanthasalo sustained serious injuries as a result of the
second accident.28 9 He sued Deshotel, among others.2 90 Chanthasalo
contended that Deshotel's alleged substandard conduct was the cause
of the injuries he suffered as a result of the second accident.2 9
Deshotel's insurer filed a motion for summary judgment in which it
contended that the scope of duty owed by Deshotel to Chanthasalo did
not extend to the remote possibility that he might be struck by a vehicle
in a separate, unrelated accident.2 92
The trial court granted the motion, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.293 The court very appropriately discussed the reasons why
drivers should not follow too closely and the risks that following the
car ahead entails. 2 9 4 It then concluded by stating:
[W]e find no ease of association between Accident No. 1 and Accident
No. 2.... The duty Ms. Deshotel owed to Mr. Chanthasalo from the first
accident-not to follow too closely and drive at a safe speed-did not
extend to cover him for the risk of injury from an unrelated second
accident.295
It is a classic Duty/Risk decision based on common sense and a
purposeful analysis of the rule-not to follow too closely-and the
reason for the rule. It is also extremely fact-specific, and it is not an
analysis of the "policies" of tort law. For what policies, other than basic
fairness, are at play in such a case? None.
B.

Scope ofLiability in a ParticularCase Is About Fairness,Not
Policy, andIt Is a Mixed Question of Fact andLaw for the Fact
Finder;It Is Not a Question ofLaw for the Court

If it appears that I am being critical of the opinions described in
the previous subpart, let me clarify. Many of them are technically and
286.
287.
288.
289.

Chanthasalo,2017-0521 atp. 1; 234 So. 3d at 1105.
Id
Id
Id

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at p. 2, 234 So. 3d at 1105.

at pp. 3, 12; 234 So. 3d at 1106, 1111.
at pp. 9-10; 234 So. at 1109-10.
at p. 10, 234 So. 3d at 1110.
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analytically excellent opinions. They discuss jurisprudence; they are
purposive in analyzing the reason for the so-called "rules of law" or
conduct they consider. They are logical. Some of them are fine
examples of judicial reasoning at its best. All that praise aside, they do
not expressly articulate, analyze, and apply the policies that Leon
Green argued were at the core of determining the scope of liability or
duty in a torts case.2 96 Indeed, there may be a very good reason the
courts often do not discuss Green's policies.
As my friend and colleague, torts Professor Martha Chamallis
commented to me at a conference at which both of us were about to
present on the subject of this Article: The courts say their decisions are
based on policy, but is policy really the basis of decision in a gardenvariety Duty/Risk case? It does not seem so. She is exactly right. When
one considers whether the defendant ought to be liable to the particular
plaintiff before the court for the particular risk, which arose in the
particular manner in which it arose, the grand policies of torts are not
at issue. What is at issue is a basic notion of fairness. Arguably, the most
important thing is to achieve the right result in the case before the court
on the facts before the court. Concerns that a particular result based on
the unique facts of a particular case (as opposed to a decision involving
broad categories of plaintiffs, defendants, and risks) are going to
adversely impact the world seem unfounded and are never in my
experience supported by empirical evidence. The question is, based on
the unique facts and the credibility of the witnesses, should the
defendant be liable for this risk? The decision turns on the particular
facts, on the potential bizarreness of the events, and on the community's
case-specific notion of justice. It is not about broad notions of the
administration of justice or the judicial role or ethical or moral factors
or deterrence or the capacity to bear the loss. It is about a pure sense of
fairness.
Moreover, the case-specific decision on scope of liability has no
impact on the "law" of torts or the outcome of a future case. The results
are idiosyncratic and applicable only to the case decided. For instance,
in Hill, the no liability decision is limited to that case. No one would
seriously argue that, afterHill, the "law" in Louisiana was that someone
who left a ladder leaning up against the side of a house, after making
hurricane repairs, was never liable, or never owed any duty, to someone
who fell over the ladder when it was moved from the side of the house

296.

See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.

TULANE LAWREVIEW

8 10

[Vol. 94:769

to the ground by an unknown third-party.297 And no one would contend
that any policies were at stake beyond a rough sense of justice arising
out of the particular circumstances.
After Gresham, no one would suggest that the "law" in Louisiana
was that a minor who served alcohol to other minors was never not
liable where one of the minors to whom alcohol was served grabbed
the wheel of a car in which he was a passenger, causing a wreck
resulting in serious injury.298 The decision was not law, and it was not
broadly based on policy. It was a decision based on the bizarre turn of
events and circumstances.
In Roberts, the court in its initial hearing did state a legal ruleLouisiana recognized the tort of negligent hiring-but then it held that
the connection between the failure to exercise reasonable care in hiring
and training and the resulting injuries before the court were too
"attenuated" to impose liability.2 99 Recognizing the tort of negligent
hiring was a legal decision, it was applicable to other cases. But,
whether the duty not to negligently hire or train included the particular
risk that occurred in the case was not law; it was fact-specific. Indeed,
consistently with one of the messages of this piece, Justice Hall said,
"There is no 'rule' for determining the scope of the duty."3 00 Then, on
rehearing, the court narrowed its recognition of the tort of negligent
hiring when Justice Cole said, "[W]e find that the duty implicated by
this case is actually much narrower [than originally articulated;] the
duty not to promote a cook to deputy in name alone, that is, not to
engage in ersatz promotions."3 01 That was a much more case-specific
statement of any duty owed. And while the court noted that the
narrower duty's purpose was protecting the public fisc, rather than
protecting against personal injury,302 its ultimate resolution had a most
limited, if any, impact on future cases.
The Cay decision, typical for Justice Lemmon, was clear, elegant
in its direct style, and sensible. But the end result-that the duty to build
guardrails of sufficient height to protect pedestrians included the risk
that an intoxicated person, dressed in dark clothes at night, walking
with traffic rather than against it, would become surprised or scared by
297.
298.
299.
(La. 1992).
300.
301.
302.

See Hilly. Lundin& Assocs. Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
See Greshamv. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989).
Robertsv. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1044-45 (La. 1991), on reh g, 605 So. 2d 1032
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1054.
Id
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a car coming up from behind him and fall to his death-was casespecific.303 It was not law, and policy was not really involved. It was
about fairness and the interplay of liability, victim fault, and the impact
of comparative negligence.
Finally, the decision in Chanthasalowas based on the particular
facts and the time span between the initial accident and the second
collision.304 It is not now Louisiana law that rear-ending someone,
which causes the two involved cars to stop, does not result in liability
to the rear-ending driver where a subsequent rear-end collision happens
five to fifteen minutes later.305 It is, as the Romans said, sui generis. The
decision was not policy-based. In fact, there would be nothing to
prevent a lawyer in a subsequent case, with remarkably similar facts,
from arguing that people driving by an accident often slow down and
look-i.e., "rubber neck." Therefore, the lawyer in the future case
might argue that the duty to avoid a rear-end collision does include the
risk that someone will slow down to look at the results of that collision
and that a driver following the rubbernecker will also rubberneck, but
not slow down, will collide with the first rubbernecker, and will wreak
further havoc for the victim of the first collision.
None of the cases discussed above turned on policy at a level
beyond pure case-specific fairness or "ease of association." And none
of them resulted in "law" or a "rule" applicable to future cases. Recall
Justice Hall's admonition that there is no rule for determining scope of
duty.306 Wex Malone apparently would have agreed. In a wonderful
article he wrote aboutDixie Drive It Yourself 307 Wex Malone noted that
after Dixie, lawyers had urged that the "rule" of Dixie was that courts
must ignore the "intervening wrongdoing"30 8 of a third person in any
case "against a defendant whose original negligence set the stage for
the ensuing accident."30 9 in response, in the last sentence of the article,
Malone tellingly refuted that contention and wrote, "[T]he Dixie
decision represents exclusively an approach or a method of attack;
303. See Cay v. State Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393;
see also Broadnax v. Foster, 47,079, p. 8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/11/12); 92 So. 3d 427, 433 ("The

extent of protection owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is made on a case-by-case basis to avoid
making a defendant an insurer of all persons against all harms.").
304.
234 So. 3d
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 2017-0521, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17);
1103, 1110.
See id.
Roberts, 605 So. 2d at 1044.
Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5.
Id. at 392 (emphasis omitted).
Id
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there can be no such thing as a rule of the Dixie decision which might
require that the case be distinguished in future litigation."310
If there can be no such rule concerning the scope of the
defendant's duty or liability, even in a violation of statute negligence
case-because the decision is fact-specific-then why does the judge
decide scope of duty? If the decision is dependent upon the facts of the
particular case and policy is not involved at a broad class of plaintiffs,
class of risks, or class of damages level, it makes more sense for juries
or judges as fact finders to make the decision. Having judges make the
scope of duty decision, even when it clearly, per Malone, does not result
in a rule,3 1 ' runs the risk that lawyers will still treat the decision as a
legal decision and rely on it in moving for summary judgment. And
there is the risk that lower court trial and appellate judges,3 12 in deciding
and reviewing cases on summary judgment, will treat prior decisions
as if they were law and not case-specific decisions.313
In his very scholarly opinion in Pitre v. Opelousas General
3 14
Hospital,
Justice Dennis noted the limits of the Duty/Risk method,
where judges do not really analyze the relevant policies. Instead, he
endorsed a "legal cause approach" where the nature and extent of
damages was at issue. He wrote:
The legal cause [synonymous with scope of duty or liability or protection
in this paper] ofthe damage in question could be stated as part of the duty
inquiry: was the defendant under a duty to protect each of the plaintiffs
interests affected against the type of damage that did in fact occur? Such
a formi of statement is sometimes helpful because it is less likely than
"proximate cause" to be interpreted as if it were policy free fact finding;
thus, "duty" is more apt to direct attention to the policy issues which
310. Id. at 393.
311. Id.
312. Kenney v. Cox, 95-0126, p. 1 (La. 3/30/95); 652 So. 2d 992, 992 (Dennis, J.,
concurring). Therein, Justice Dennis noted the problem, stating:
Consequently, the Court of Appeal treated as purely a legal question the issue of
whether the harm caused decedent was within the scope of a duty owed her by the
defendants. Because I feel that our jurisprudence has not clarified the distinction
between the existence of a general duty of care (a legal question) and the "legal
cause" or "duty/risk" question of the particular duty owed in a particular factual
context (a mixed question of law and fact), and because this question is of special
significance in the summary judgment context, I believe that it would be appropriate
for us to grant the writ to consider this question more carefully.
Id; cf Paul v. La. State Emps.' Group Benefit Program, 1999-0897, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir.
5/12/00); 762 So. 2d 136, 143 (noting legal cause is a purely legal question).
313. Or even, if illogically, as the basis for an exception of no cause of action.
314. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).

2020]

LET THE JURYDECIDE!

813

determine the extent of the original obligation and its continuance, rather
than to the mechanical sequence of events which goes to make up
causation in fact. The duty risk approach is most helpful, however, in
cases where the only issue is in reality whether the defendant stands in
any relationship to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized
obligation of conduct for the plaintiff's benefit. Terms such as "duty" are
merely verbal expressions of policy decisions and do not explain them.
Allusions to policy should not be made a substitute for more determinate
legal principles when they may be utilized.315
There were and are other judicial indications that the scope of
responsibility question was not a purely legal question but a mixed
question of law and fact.316
In Broussardv. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings,3 17 the court
was not considering the scope of the defendant's duty, but rather the

315. Id. at 1155-56 (citations omitted). He continued, in proposing a "legal cause"
alternative:
It is the task of the bench and the bar not only to ensure that justice is done, but also
to demonstrate that it is being done accordingto law, which is essential to preserving
public confidence. Policy considerations do indeed shape one's sense of the right
decision, but whenever possible these should be given effect through the
indispensable minimum of principles of liability in negligence, nebulous though
they may be in themselves. Accordingly, we conclude that, when the case presents
difficult issues as to the nature and extent of damages ascribed to the defendant, once
it has been decided that the defendant's breach of a duty in fact caused damage to
the plaintiff, it may be helpful to use a "legal cause" analysis which affords the
application of "foreseeability" rules and other concepts of limitation. Although
indistinct, these rules and concepts are more determinate than the abstract idea of a
"duty" based on various "policy considerations" and may prove more helpful to
triers of the facts, at least as starting points for legal reasoning.
Id at 1156 (citation omitted). The rules he proposed for determining legal cause were a series
of foreseeability rules based on whether the injury resulted from impact and the level of the
defendant's fault. Id at 1161-62.
316. See, e.g., Kenney, 95-0126, p. 1; 652 So. 2d at 992 (Dennis, J., concurring). Justice
Dennis, concurring in a reversal of a summary judgment for defendant, wrote:
Consequently, the Court of Appeal treated as purely a legal question the issue of
whether the harm caused decedent was within the scope of a duty owed her by the
defendants. Because I feel that our jurisprudence has not clarified the distinction
between the existence of a general duty of care (a legal question) and the "legal
cause" or "duty/risk" question of the particular duty owed in a particular factual
context (a mixed question of law and fact), and because this question is of special
significance in the summary judgment context, I believe that it would be appropriate
for us to grant the writ to consider this question more carefully.
Id; see also Parents of Minor Childv. Charlet, 2013-2879, p. 6 (La. 4/4/14); 135 So. 3d 1177,
1181 ("Whether this particular priest owed this particular duty to the plaintiffs in this particular
factual context is a mixed question of law and fact.").
317. 2012-1238 (La. 4/5/13); 113 So. 3d 175.
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conflation of duty and breach318 that had occurred or might occur in
Louisiana "open and obvious" cases.3 19 There, the court held that
determining breach-whether a thing posed an unreasonable risk of
harm-involved a "myriad of factual considerations," "an abundance
of factual findings," and "an application of those facts to a less-than
scientific standard, [such that] a reviewing court is in no better position
to make the determination than the jury or trial court."320 The same is
true for scope of liability or duty. A decision on the scope of liability or
duty involves the facts and factual findings. It involves fairness and
justice at a case-specific level. It is the essence of a mixed question of
law and fact. Scope ofliability or duty is a matterfor thefactfinder not
the lawgiver. And its legal or persuasive force is nil except as the
decision of a particular case at a particular time and place by a particular
fact finder. It is time for the Louisiana courts to recognize this basic
truth and consistently articulate it and apply it. I return to this point in
my final Part of recommendations. But in the next subpart I discuss the
courts' inconsistent articulation of the various elements of the
Duty/Risk analysis and the order in which a court should consider each
of those elements.32

318. A related subject beyond the scope of this piece.
319. Broussard, 2012-1238 atp. 1, 113 So. 3dat 178.
320. Id. atpp. 12-13, 113 So. 3d at 185-86 (citing and quoting Reedv. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 97-1174, p. 4 (La. 3/4/98); 708 So. 2d 362, 364-65).
321. Louisiana courts have also manifested two other tendencies that are not inevitable
but that are unfortunate. These two tendencies also point in the direction of necessary change.
First, some courts continue to mix together cause-in-fact and scope of duty or "proximate"
cause. Second, courts still tend to emphasize the order in which events have occurred rather
than the relation between the alleged tortious behavior and the risk and employ terms like
"superseding cause" or "sole proximate cause." To reiterate, one of the primary targets of the
legal realists-Green and Malone-was to force courts and lawyers to acknowledge and to
separate the factual issue of cause from the scope of duty question. See text accompanying
supra notes 59-60. The issue of factual cause is what we have come to call cause-in-fact. Courts
usually decide cause-in-fact by asking whether it is more likely than not that "but for" the
defendant's particular, alleged act of negligence, the plaintiff would not have suffered the
particular injuries involved. Some cases use the substantial factor language but then essentially
use the "but for" test. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Sellers, 390 So. 2d 870, 873 (La. 1980); Perkins
v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 147 So. 2d 646, 648-49 (La. 1962). Alternatively, the court
will sometimes ask whether the defendant's negligence was a "substantial factor" in bringing
about the plaintiff's injuries. Jeremiah Smith articulated the "substantial factor" test, and Green
endorsed it. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supranote 12, at 137, 140-41 (quoting
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1912)). Arguably,
Malone's most renowned article is on cause-in-fact. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,

supra note 1. Happily, for the most part, courts ably keep the cause-in-fact analysis separate
from the scope of duty or liability analysis but not always. In Vince v. Koontz, 16-52 1, p. 10
(La. App. 5th Cir. 2/8/17); 213 So. 3d 448, 456,
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InconsistentAnalyticalApproaches, i.e., Duty Risk Deviations

As noted in the previous subpart, courts frequently do not and, I
contend, neither should nor can make a meaningful policy analysis in
a garden-variety tort case at the fact- or case-specific level. The courts'
failure to engage in that fact-specific policy analysis is not flawed; it is
inevitable, and it counsels the need to entrust the case-specific scope of
duty question to the fact finder as a mixed question of fact and law,
rather than to the judge as a legal question. But, before continuing that
discussion, another rather unfortunate judicial trend demands our
attention. Louisiana courts are remarkably inconsistent in their
articulation of the order of the key steps or elements in the Duty/Risk
analysis and in articulating the proper method courts should use in
analysis.

the jury was informed "proximate cause" is "the primary act which produces the
accident." After consideration of the foregoing, we find this definition describes
the cause-in-fact element. Accordingly, when the jury found Mr. Koontz's
negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the accident, it appears the jury actually
determined that Mr. Koontz's negligence was not the cause-in-fact of the accident.
The court concluded that the trial judge had not properly instructed on proximate cause. Id. But
the court held that the error was essentially harmless because the jury in finding no proximate
cause had actually found no cause-in-fact. Id. at p. 11-12, 213 So. 3d at 457. That decision was
not manifestly erroneous because "a defendant's negligence may be severed by intervening
and superseding causes." Id at p. 12, 213 So. 3d at 457. The reader will note that intervening
and superseding causes were terms that courts used in determining proximate cause, not causein-fact. Lahare v. Valentine Mech. Sers., LLC, 17-289, p. 6 (La. App. 5th Cir. 6/29/17); 223
So. 3d 773, 778 (While it may be true that Ms. Lahare would not have been walking from
door to door but for Valentine's actions, the alleged defect in the sidewalk was the intervening
and superseding cause of her injuries. And these injuries, caused as they were by tripping over
an alleged defect in the sidewalk, were certainly not a reasonably foreseeable risk of
Valentine's failure to obtain the proper permit or failure to assist in the variance process. Ms.
Lahare cannot prove cause-in-fact."). Thus, it bears emphasizing that cause-in-fact and scope
of liability are two separate issues. Whoever decides scope of liability, it is a different issue
than cause-in-fact. Cause-in-fact entails a fact-based decision and analysis comparing the
defendant's alleged act of negligence and the injuries that the plaintiff suffered. Scope of duty
or liability may depend upon the facts, but it is ultimately a decision about fairness, not about
causation.
Additionally, some Louisiana courts continue to use terms like intervening and/or
superseding cause, see, e.g., Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 2007-2110, p. 13 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So.
2d 798, 808; Vince, 16-521, p. 12; 213 So. 3d at 457; Arcadian Corp. v. Olin Corp., 2001-1060,
p. 7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/8/02); 824 So. 2d 396, 401; Domingue v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety,
490 So. 2d 772, 775 (La. App. 3d Cir 1986), or "sole cause," see, e.g., Lewis v. Macke Bldg.
Sers., Inc., 524 So. 2d 16, 18-19 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Wood v. Haas, 451 So. 2d 160,
162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). And courts continue to emphasize the order of events. See
Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 2017-0521, pp. 9-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So.3d 1103,
1109-10.
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The reader will recall that after Hill, the analytical order of the
elements was cause-in-fact, duty/risk, breach, and damages.3 22 In the
first years after Hill, at least some appellate courts considered the
elements in the so-called Hill order.323 But it was not long before courts
began reordering the elements of negligence under the Duty/Risk
analytical approach to negligence. For instance, in Frank v. Pitre, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, while citing Hill,
articulated the elements in the following order: duty, breach, cause-infact, and scope of protection.324 It was not long before the Louisiana
Supreme Court followed suit and deviated from the Hill analytical
order of negligence elements.
For instance, in the Louisiana Supreme Court's original opinion
in Roberts v. Benoit, echoing Frank, Justice Hall listed the elements of
negligence as follows: cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of
protection. 325 Then, on rehearing, Justice Cole listed the elements as
follows: duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages.326 In
addition to switching the analytical order in which decision makers
address the elements of negligence, Justice Cole used the phrase legal
cause instead of scope of protection.
Subsequently, in Cay v. State DOTD, the court said negligence
consisted of cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of duty.327 In Joseph
v. Dickerson, the court repeated that order of analysis but used the
words legal cause, instead of scope of protection, and added

322. Hill v. Lundin Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (La. 1972).
323. See, e.g, Carter v. City Par. Gov't of E. Baton Rouge, 423 So. 2d 1080, 1084-88
(La. 1982); Lee v. Vidrine, 316 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Stewart v. Gibson
Prods. of Natchitoches Par. La., Inc., 300 So. 2d 870, 876-77 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Mixon
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 So. 2d 232, 235-39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974). Once again, I am not

trying to be encyclopedic here, merely to show some trends. Hill has been cited by courts 454
times.
324.
325.

341 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (citing Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621-23).
605 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (La. 1991), on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992) (dealing

with negligent hiring, training, and supervising and vicarious liability); see also Lazard v. Foti,
2002-2888, p. 3 (La. 10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 656, 659 (listing them as cause-in-fact, duty, breach,
and scope of protection); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222, p. 4 (La. 11/30/99); 752

So. 2d 762, 765 (listing them as cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of protection).
326. Roberts, 605 So. 2dat 1051.
327. 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393, 395-99; see also Broadnax v. Foster,
47,079, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/11/12); 92 So. 3d 427, 432 (listing them as cause-in-fact,

duty, breach, and scope of protection); Williams ex rel. Williams v. Jones, 2009-839, p. 5 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2/23/10); 34 So. 3d 926, 929-30 (same).
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damages.328 The variety of ordering approaches has continued.329 For
instance, in Chanthasalov. Deshotel, the court stated that the elements
of negligence were duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and
damages,330 echoing Justice Cole's order of elements from Roberts.3 3
Of course, one may shrug one's shoulders and say, what or why
does it matter? And perhaps it really doesn't matter if the same basic
elements are at issue whatever order one employs to consider them. But
I think it does matter. For one thing, it causes confusion.33 2 Just what
are the elements of negligence, and how does a lawyer or a lower court
judge present them? The confusion leads to inconsistency in approach.
Emerson was no doubt right when he said, "A foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and
philosophers and divines."3 33 The key word of course is "foolish."
There is value in consistency. It allows people to plan and to rely upon
stable rules and expectations. One may counter that if the substantive
elements (rules) are the same, the order in which a court analyzes them

328. 99-1046, 99-1188, p. 6 (La. 1/19/00); 754 So. 2d 912, 916.
329. Wiltzv. Bros. Petroleum, L.L.C., 2013-332, 2013-334, 2013-333, p. 9 (La. App.
5th Cir. 4/23/14); 140 So. 3d 758, 766-67 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause or

scope of liability or protection, and actual damages); J.M. ex rel. A.C. v. Acadia Par. Sch. Bd.,
2008-1377, p. 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/1/09); 7 So. 3d 150, 153 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-

fact, scope of liability or protection, and damages); cf Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 20081163, 2008-1169, pp. 26-27 (La. 5/22/09); 16 So. 3d 1065, 1086 (listing cause-in-fact, duty,
breach, scope of protection); Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952, pp. 4-5 (La. 11/30/94);

646 So. 2d 318, 321-22 (listing cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of protection); England
v. Fifth La. Levee Dist., 49,795, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/3/15); 167 So. 3d 1105, 1109-10
(same); Covington v. Howard, 49,135, p. 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/13/14); 146 So. 3d 933, 937

(listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages); Kulka v. Shag II, 2012-398, p.
5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/24/12); 100 So. 3d 412, 415 (same); Frederick v. Vermillion Par. Sch.
Bd., 2000-382, p. 3-4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/18/00); 772 So. 2d 208, 212 (listing duty, breach,

cause-in-fact, and scope of protection), writ denied, 781 So. 2d 561 (La. 2001). Compare, using
the classic Hill order, Thomas v. Sisters of Charityof the Incarnate Word, 38,170, p. 10 (La.

App. 2d Cir. 3/19/04); 870 So. 2d 390, 397 (listing cause-in-fact, duty, breach, scope of
protection).
330. 2017-0521, p. 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So. 3d 1103, 1107-08; see also
Chatmanv. S. Univ. at New Orleans, 2015-1179, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 7/16/16); 197

So. 3d 366, 374 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages).
331.

See Roberts,605 So. 2dat 1051.

332. Last year when we were discussing the changing order of negligence in my torts
class, a student, Corinne Gamble, raised her hand and asked, in reference to the shifting order
of elements, "Can they do that?" I nodded slowly and said, "Yes, they, especially the Louisiana
Supreme Court, can do what they want."
333.

Quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/

quotes/353571-a-foolish-consistency-is-the-hobgoblin-of-little-minds-adored (last visited Feb. 27,
2020).
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will not impact the primary activity33 4 of those subject to the rules. But
the order of analysis will impact the activity and strategy of lawyers
who are working to protect the rights of those engaged in planning their
primary activity in commerce, medicine, manufacturing, hiring, and
even driving. I would contend that lawyers are important actors on
today's American stage of economic activity and to the extent lawyers
are confused by inconsistent analysis and application of law, the
confusion will have a potential impact on those subject to that law. In
the case of tort law, that is all of us.
Let me pause for a moment and make some observations on the
Hill order of analysis. Reiterating, the court began with cause-in-fact as
the first element in the analysis.335 Perhaps it made sense to analyze
cause-in-fact first because, if there is no factual cause, then the
appropriate decision maker need not undertake the stickier, more
fairness-based analyses of Duty/Risk and breach. That is fine for a trial
to the bench, but what about ajury trial? Confusion abounds when the
second element per Hillis Duty/Risk.33 6 Does the defendant owe a duty
to this plaintiff to protect against the relevant risk? If this is indeed a
question of law, then the judge decides it as lawgiver and not as fact
finder. This is where, per Green and Malone, the court supposedly
conducts a legal/social policy analysis.3 37 Even if the particular scope
of risk question is for the fact finder, the broader duty issue is for the
court, and if duty (or Duty/Risk) is the second (or second and third
elements and, as noted above, many courts have split the Duty/Risk
question into two questions), the court still makes a legal decision after
the fact finder has made a factual or mixed fact and law decision (on
cause-in-fact). That is all well and good; however, if the purpose of
having the court analyze cause-in-fact first was to avoid the necessity
of a policy-based duty or Duty/Risk decision, the logic of the order is
suspect. It is suspect because whenever the fact finder decides that the
defendant was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries and the court
decides that there is no duty (or the risk was not within the scope of any
duty as a matter of law), the fact finder will have made a meaningless

334.

See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-82, 403-04 (1970);

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 450 (tent. ed. 1958).
335. Hill y. Lundin Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 1972).
336. Id.
337. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77; Malone,
Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5.
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cause-in-fact determination, which is certainly not efficient. And in a
jury trial, the court will have empaneled a jury to make that decision.
The illogic does not stop there. If the fact finder decides that the
defendant was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries and the court
decides that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty and that the risk
was within the scope of the duty, then and only then, per the Hill
elemental schemata, does the fact finder decide whether there has been
a breach of the relevant duty.338 It is a veritable tennis match of
negligence elements between the judge and the fact finder. The fact
finder decides cause-in-fact. The lawgiver decides duty and/or
Duty/Risk. The fact finder decides breach.
It is even worse for those courts that separate the duty and risk
elements.33 9 Those courts that separate the two have an additional
volley. For instance, in Cay, the court considered the elements of
negligence in the following order: cause-in-fact, duty, breach, scope of
protection, and damages.340 Thus, the allocation of decision-making in
the order would be:
Element
Cause-in-Fact
Duty
Breach
Scope of Liability
Damages

Who Decides
Fact Finder
Judge
Fact Finder
Judge34 1
Fact Finder3 42

One may safely assume that the hypothetical back-and-forth volleying
of decision-making between judge and fact finder would not require
multiple coffee breaks between elements (sets!) in a jury trial.
Presumably, the judge would decide those issues the judge should
decide, and the fact finder would decide those issues the fact finder
should decide. In a case tried to the court, the judge would be careful
to separate his or her functions. In either case, would it make sense to
group the elements together in order with the appropriate decision
makers? Otherwise, there is one potential "order" of decision at trial
338. Hill, 256 So. 2dat623.
339. See cases cited supra note 329.
340. Cay v. State ex. rel Dep't & Transp. & Dev., 93-0087 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d
393, 395-99.

341. Of course, the argument herein is that the jury or judge as fact finder should decide
scope of liability.
342. And the fact finder would thereafter consider whether the plaintiff was also
negligent (as in Cay) and allocate fault. Id. at 399.

TULANE LAWREVIEW

820

[Vol. 94:769

and another on appeal. That has the potential to confuse lawyers,
judges, law students, and people writing about the law.3 43 Moreover,
having different trial orders of deciding and appellate orders of
deciding is inconsistent with transparency unless it is clearly explained.
My sense is that any explanation of the inconsistency could never be
quite clear to someone untrained in the law; nor would it be wholly
convincing to someone trained in the law.
The court ought to decide "law" issues first. First, if there is no
duty, there is no reason to empanel a jury, no reason to call witnesses,
etc. The case is over before the justice system spends precious societal
resources on deciding factual questions or mixed questions of fact and
law. Second, having the court decide legal issues first is consistent with
trial process and practice. That is, typically, the plaintiff sues. The
defendant at that stage, even before answering, can move for dismissal.
In Louisiana, the appropriate procedural devices are the exception of
no cause of action or the exception of no right of action.3 44 The
defendant claims that, based on the pleadings, the plaintiff has not
alleged any viable cause of action against it. In a negligence case, the
defendant says, I owe no duty to the plaintiff. Or the defendant says,
While I may owe a duty to someone, I do not owe a duty to this person.
These are legal questions that the court can decide at the outset. If the
court denies the exception(s), then the machination of developing and
discovering facts can begin.345 Of course if reasonable minds could not
disagree on cause-in-fact, breach, or scope of liability/risk, a court
might grant a summary judgment for one side or the other before
trial. 3 46
Finally, beyond the order of decision, as I have pointed out, courts
are not consistent in their analytical approaches to deciding negligence.
Some refer to scope of liability or scope of the risk. Others use the
phrase legal cause. And courts, even the same court on the same case,
mix approaches. For instance, in Lazardv. Foti, the parents of a sixteenyear-old who was detained by law enforcement as an adult, released,
343. I.e., law professors.
344.

LA. CODE CIv. PROC. arts. 923, 927(A)(5)-(6) (2020).

345. Thereafter if the court denies the exceptions, the defendant would answer, the
parties would conduct discovery, and then the defendant might move for summary judgment.
Of course, the defendant might move for summary judgment on any issue, contending that
there are no material issues of fact. In a negligence action, where the defendant moves for
summary judgment because there are no material issues of fact, the court must be careful to
gauge exactly what it is deciding: a legal matter or a factual matter or a matter involving a
mixed question of fact and law.
346.

Id. art 966.
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and killed twelve hours later, sued the sheriff who had detained the
minor.3 47 The majority held that the sheriff was not liable,348 but there
were three opinions revealing three very different approaches to the
duty, scope of duty, Duty/Risk, and legal cause conundra. Justice
Traylor's majority opinion was straight Duty/Risk and analyzed the
scope of duty imposed by a statute, its underlying policy and purpose,
and its reach.349 Justice Weimer's concurrence suggested
considerations of time, place, and bizarreness.350 Finally, Justice
Johnson in her dissent called for a trial of the underlying claim because
of critical factual issues that bore on the scope and reach of any duty
owed.35 1
VI. RECAP AND REENERGIZING

Before proceeding, a short recap is advisable. The law's
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach to deciding
proximate cause was a fake. Judges hid a fairness decision behind
vague "magic" words like cause, foreseeable, unforeseeable, direct,
remote, natural and probably, intervening causes, superseding causes,
and more.352 The great torts scholars of the twentieth century, including
Green and Malone, building on the work of some who came before
them, saw, in the spirit of Legal Realism, that something else was going

347. 2002-2888, p. 1 (La. 10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 656, 658; see also Brooks v. State ex
rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 2010-1908, pp. 3-10 (La. 7/1/11); 74 So. 3d 187, 189-93
(containing different approaches to negligence in the opinions). There the decedent, while at
work as operating engineer, was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of a state highway in an
industrial area to deliver to another company (and thereby avoid expense of loading the
backhoe onto a truck). Brooks, 2010-1908, at p. 1, 74 So. 3d at 188. The backhoe flipped while
making a turn from the highway shoulder onto a driveway and crushed the man to death. Id at
pp. 1-2, 74 So. 3d at 188-89. The man's family filed a wrongful death suit against the DOTD.
Id at p. 2, 74 So. 3d at 189. There was a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and it was
affirmed by the appellate court but amended to attribute 20% of fault to the driver. Id In
denying recovery, the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the condition of the
shoulder did not present an unreasonable risk of harm and that the DOTD's duty did not
encompass the risk that occurred. Id at pp. 8-10, 74 So. 3d at 192-93. Justice Knoll concurred
but found that the DOTD did not owe the decedent any duty. Id at p. 1, 74 So. 3d at 195 (Knoll,
J., concurring). Justice Johnson dissented, finding that the DOTD owed the decedent a duty,
which it breached. Id at pp. 1-3, 74 So. 3d at 194-95 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
348. Lazard, 2002-2888, p. 8, 859 So. 2d at 662.
349. See id. at pp. 5-8, 859 So. 2d at 660-62.
350. See id at p. 1, 859 So. 2d at 666 (Weimer, J., concurring) (quoting Roberts v.
Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1058 (La. 1991)).
351. See id. at pp. 6-7, 859 So. 2d at 665 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
352. See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64.
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on. They knew that judges using magic words were like the wizard
working in Oz.
Green and Malone ripped back the curtain, and they claimed that
the issue courts called proximate cause was really an issue of policy,
involving various policies at stake in the administration ofjustice.353 As
noted, Green articulated those policies as the following: the
administrative factor, the ethical or moral factor, the economic factor,
the prophylactic or preventive factor, and the justice factor, including
the capacity to bear the loss. 35 4 But, as the discussion in Part V above
showed, Louisiana courts in most garden-variety torts cases have not,
in fact, analyzed policy but have instead made case-specific, fairnessbased decisions dependent on the facts of the particular case before the
court. I have contended herein that these fact-specific fairness decisions
are not "policy"-based decisions for a court but are more appropriately
mixed questions of fact and law. And, as such, the scope of liability/risk
question is really a question for the fact finder and resolution of the
scope of liability/risk issue is dependent on the specific facts at issue.
It is not a legal decision. If it is "law" at all, it is only "law" for the
parties to the particular case; it is not "law" for anyone else. Treating
scope of liability/risk in a garden-variety tort case as a legal decision
would also impact the standard of review that an appellate court
employs: de novo on issues of law or manifest error on issues of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. If the scope of liability determination
is a legal determination, then the court would review it de novo, but if
it is a mixed question of law and fact law, the court's review would be
under the manifest error standard.3 55 Since the scope of liability/risk
decision should be for the fact finder, the appropriate standard of
review should be manifest error.
In so contending, I am echoing what my friend Dave Robertson
said over twenty years ago when he proposed his "Keetonian" model
for allocating decision-making in Louisiana tort cases.356 He said that
fact finders should decide scope of liability.35 7 I am also influenced by
my friend Professor Chamallis' observation, noted above, that policy
really is not at stake in most garden-variety negligence cases. That is,
353. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77; Malone,
Cause-in-Fact,supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5.
354. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.
355. See, e.g., Adams v. Rhodia, 2007-2110, p. 10 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So. 2d 798, 806

(reviewing a determination of scope of risk under the manifest error standard).
356.
3 57.

Robertson, AllocatingAuthority, supra note 19, at 1092-96.
Id.
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at the fact-specific level, most tort cases really are not vehicles for
shaping future conduct and influencing law and society. Most cases
involve basic fairness between the parties, based on the particular facts.
There are policy-dominant cases where the law can shape the future.
These are what I think of as true duty cases-cases like those discussed
in the next Part. In those cases, the issues are analyzed at the categorical
level, and the courts truly do (and should) consider the policy
implications of their decisions. But most tort cases are not like that;
they are not categorical, but fact-specific. There, policy is not involved;
the case will not shape the future. But the decision will hopefully
provide case-specific justice for the parties.
Returning to Robertson, Justice Lemmon, in a concurring opinion
in Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, quoted Robertson and his
coauthors as follows:
The statement that "the defendant had no duty," as noted in Professor
David W. Robertson et al, Cases and Materials on Torts 161 (1989),
should be reserved for those "situations controlled by a rule of law of
enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases raising
the problem to dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for
defendant on the basis of the rule." Thus, a "no duty" defense generally
applies when there is a categorical rule excluding liability as to whole
categories of claimants or of claims under any circumstances. In the
usual case where the duty owed depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, analysis of the defendant's conduct should be done in
terms of "no liability" or "no breach of duty."358
So, where in the negligence formula, if anywhere, does the
Green/Malone policy analysis take place? Like Robertson said: at the
duty determination. And, like Robertson and his coauthors noted, the
court should engage in the duty/no duty analysis at the categorical
level, not at the case-specific level. There are, in fact, Louisiana
Supreme Court cases that wonderfully demonstrate the appropriate
categorical level of analysis. I turn next to two of those decisions.
VII. DUTY AS POLICY
In Reynolds v. Bordelon, the issue before the court was whether
Louisiana would recognize a claim for negligent spoliation.35 9 The
358. 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 22 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (Leninon, J.,
concurring) (quoting DAvID W. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM POWERS, JR. & DAVID A. ANDERSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 161 (1989)).

359.

2014-2362, p. 1 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 589, 592.
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court decided that it would not, in part because there were multiple
other avenues available to protect litigants where evidence was, or
might be, destroyed or damaged.36 0 Justice Clark clearly and, in my
schematic for decision, properly articulated the issue as a duty issue.3 61
In discussing that duty issue, he analyzed and wrote categorically. The
decision and opinion did not depend upon the specific facts of the case,
but rather on the categorical issue of whether Louisiana should
recognize a duty to preserve evidence from negligent destruction. The
court carefully discussed the relevant policies and considered each in
the context of whether Louisiana should impose a duty not to
negligently destroy evidence.362 Justice Clark analyzed the broad issue
in terms of "deterrence of undesirable conduct, avoiding the deterrence
of desirable conduct, compensation of victims, satisfaction of the
community's sense ofjustice, proper allocation of resources (including
judicial resources), predictability, and deference to the legislative
will."3

63

The reader will recognize these policies as a modernized

statement of the Green policies.3 6 4 In deciding not to recognize a duty,
the court articulated "a categorical rule excluding liability as to [a]
whole categor[y] of claimants or of claims under any
circumstances."3 65 And it did so after considering each of the policy
factors articulated above.366

360.

Id at pp. 13-14, 172 So. 3d at 600. The court said:

Discovery sanctions and criminal sanctions are available for first-party spoliators.
Additionally, Louisiana recognizes the adverse presumption against litigants who
had access to evidence and did not make it available or destroyed it. Regarding
negligent spoliation by third parties, the plaintiff who anticipates litigation can enter
into a contract to preserve the evidence and, in the event of a breach, avail himself
of those contractual remedies. Court orders for preservation are also obtainable. In
this particular case, the plaintiff also could have retained control of his vehicle and
not released it to the insurer, thereby guaranteeing its availability for inspection.
Furthermore, he could have bought the vehicle back from the insurer for a nominal
fee. Thus, we find the existence of alternate avenues for recovery further support our
holding.
Id
361. See id. at pp. 1, 8, 172 So. 3d at 592, 596-97.
362. See id. at pp. 8-13, 172 So. 3d at 596-600.
363. Id atp. 8, 172 So. 3d at 596 (quoting FRANKL. MARAIST& THOMAS C. GALLIGAN,
JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 5.02 (2d ed. 2004)).
364. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152.
365. Pitr v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 1 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596
(Lemmon, J., concurring).

366. It is not important for present purposes whether one agrees with the court's
decision. Its method, for my purposes, is unassailable.
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Years before, in Pitre v. Opelousas GeneralMedicalCenter,367 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered how Louisiana tort law would
approach wrongful pregnancy,368 wrongful birth,369 and wrongful life
claims.370 The court, in a scholarly opinion by then-Justice Dennis,
considered precedent in other states on the relevant issues-an
appropriate factor.37 ' As to the child's claim, Justice Dennis aptly
applied the policies of tort law at the categorical level. He wrote:
The persons at whose disposal society has placed the potent implements
of technology owe a heavy moral obligation to use them carefully and to
avoid foreseeable harm to present or future generations. In the field of
medicine, as in that of manufacturing, the need for compensation of
innocent victims of defective products and negligently delivered services
is a powerful factor influencing tort law. Typically in these areas also the
defendants' capacity to bear and distribute the losses is far superior to
that of consumers. Additionally these defendants are in a much better
position than the victims to analyze the risks involved in the defendants'
activities and to either take precautions to avoid them or to insure against
them. Consequently, a much stronger and more effective incentive to
prevent the occurrence of future harm will be created by placing the
burden of foreseeable losses on the defendants than upon the
disorganized, uninformed victims. 37 2

One will recognize that the policies he articulated and considered were
morality, compensation, capacity to bear the loss, who is in the best
position to analyze and prevent the loss, 3 73 and deterrence. As can be
seen, the court analyzed each of the applicable policies at the
categorical level, not at the case-specific level. In this regard, the

367.

530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).

368. The claim of the parents that they became pregnant, usually as a result of the fault
of a health care provider, when they did not intend to do so. Id at 1153-54.
369. The claim of the parents that they became pregnant, usually as a result of the fault
of a health care provider, with a child who suffered from some condition that made it more
burdensome to raise the child than one might otherwise anticipate. Id
370. The claim of a child born, usually as a result of the fault of a health care provider,
with a condition that made life more challenging than one would otherwise anticipate. Id
371.

See id. at 1154-55, 1157-58.

372. Id at 1157. Interestingly, Justice Dennis later lists these same policy factors as he
begins to discuss legal cause. Id at 1161. Perhaps this is due to the inevitable overlap between
factors relevant to decision of the various elements of negligence. But I would contend that it
is not for the fact finder, when deciding scope of liability, to attempt to undertake any
articulated logical analysis of the articulated policies other than as part of its decision on basic
fairness or common sense.
373. See id at 1157. This policy is a variation on Judge Calabresi's "cheapest or easier
cost avoider." See GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 135 n.1 (1970).
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analysis is similar to the analysis in Reynolds.37 4 Both opinions reflect
a broad, policy-based analysis and articulate duty rules or no duty rules
based on that policy analysis.3 75
But what about at the more case-specific level, and who should
decide what? I have already argued that the scope of duty or liability is
generally not a policy question; it is a matter of common sense, justice,
and fairness. And it is a decision for the fact finder, not the lawgiver.
By recognizing that reality and properly allocating decision-making
responsibility, Louisiana courts will clarify the law, ensure consistency,
and avoid over particularized, picayune, fact-specific decisions
masquerading as legal decisions. They will also join the mainstream of
American tort law, as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.
VIII. FOLLOWING THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD): A BRIGHTER,
CLEARER, BETTER FUTURE

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm abandons the terms proximate and legal cause.37 6 This
makes sense because of the intellectual damage these terms have done
and the confusion they have caused. In addition, when addressing duty,
the redactors imposed a general duty to exercise reasonable care.377
That is, one person generally owes another person a duty to exercise

374. Notably there are other Louisiana Supreme Court decisions where the court
undertakes a level at the broad policy level but then decides that, rather than articulate a duty
or no duty rule at the categorical level to leave future decisions to the Duty/Risk approach to
negligence. See, e.g, Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1011-18 (La. 1993)
(discussing thoroughly the various national approaches to deciding to whom a duty is owed in
a negligent misrepresentation case and then, rather than adopting any of those approaches,
deciding the case under Louisiana's Duty/Risk approach to negligence); PPG Indus. Inc. v.
Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1060-62 (La. 1984) (rejecting a categorical no duty rule in
negligent infliction of economic harm cases and relying on the Duty/Risk analysis instead).
375. See also LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990) (discussing
broad policy for duty). There the court recognized a claim for bystander emotional distress in
a negligence action after an extensive analysis of what other jurisdictions' courts had decided
and their reasoning. Id. at 564-70. The court also recognized the desire, when articulating a
new cause of action, to move cautiously and give the lower courts direction, which the court
did. See id. at 570-71. Justice Lemmon's opinion is a masterpiece of traditional legal reasoning
and writing. The legislature later essentially codified the decision with some variation. See LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020).

376. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
special note on proximate cause (AM. LAw INST. 2005).
377. Id § 7: see also id § 6 ( An actor wh1ose negligence is a factuIl cause of phI sical
lhaIn is subject to liabiliy for any stucl lharn within the scope of liabilit. unless the court
determines that the ordinary duli of reasonable care is inapplicable.).
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reasonable care-a duty to be careful. The general duty to exercise
reasonable care is sensible. "Such is the language of the street." 3 78 It is
consistent with how nonlawyers, i.e., jurors, think.
The Restatement (Third) also provides that the general duty to
exercise reasonable care may not apply in exceptional cases. What
would justify an exception? When is there "an articulated countervailing
principle or policy [that] warrants denying or limiting liability"? 3 79 That
is, in deciding whether there is a reason to find no duty or to limit the
general duty of reasonable care, the court should consider policy at a
broad, categorical level. 38 0 This is precisely what the Louisiana
Supreme Court did in Reynolds in deciding that Louisiana would not
impose a duty not to negligently destroy evidence.3 8 1
But what does the Restatement (Third) say about scope of
liability? "An important difference between them is that no-duty rules
are matters of law decided by the courts, while the defendant's scope
of liability is a question of fact for the factfinder." 382 Recognizing that
scope of liability is a question for the fact finder, as Professor Robertson
argued, is appropriate because, as noted above, it depends upon the
facts of the particular case.383 It is not law. It is for the fact finder, which,
as noted below, the Restatement (Third) recognizes.
As noted, the Restatement (Third) test for determining scope of
liability is remarkably similar to the Louisiana Duty/Risk approach.
Indeed, the redactors call their approach the "risk standard." 384 What is
the Restatement (Third) "risk standard"? "An actor's liability is limited
to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct
tortious."" In this regard, then, the drafters borrowed from the Legal

378.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,

dissenting).
379.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 7(b).
380.

Id.

§ 7 cmt.

i ("A no-duty ruling represents a determination, a purely legal question,

that no liability should be imposed on actors in a category of cases. Such a ruling should be
explained and justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify exempting these
actors from liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care. These reasons of policy
and principle do not depend on the foreseeability of harm based on the specific facts of a case.
They should be articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.").
381.

See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2362 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 589.

382.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 7 cmt. a.
383.

Robertson, AllocatingAuthority, supra note 19, at 1092-96.

384.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABLITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 29 cmt. d.
385.

Id. § 29.
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Realist approach and the Louisiana approach. But, as the Restatement
(Third) makes clear, it is for the jury (fact finder) to decide scope of
liability.38 6 Comment d provides, in part:
Thus, the jury should be told that, in deciding whether the plaintiff's
harm is within the scope of liability, it should go back to the reasons for
finding the defendant engaged in negligent or other tortious conduct. If
the harms risked by that tortious conduct include the general sort of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is subject to liability for the
plaintiff's harm. When defendants move for a determination that the
plaintiff's harm is beyond the scope of liability as a matter of law, courts
must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the defendant's
conduct that the jury could find as the basis for determining that conduct
tortious. Then, the court can compare the plaintiff's harm with the range
of harms risked by the defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury
might find the former among the latter.387
Clearly, then, the Restatement (Third) allocates the scope of liability
determination to the jury. The third sentence, which begins to deal with
a defendant moving for judgment as a matter of law, does not
contemplate the court making a legal decision; rather it contemplates a
court deciding whether reasonable minds could not disagree on the
scope of liability issue. Put in Louisiana parlance, the Restatement
(Third) asks whether a juror (or judge as fact finder) could easily
associate the risk that arose in the particular case with what the
defendant did, which the juror considered to be a breach of the standard
of care. As the redactors note, the risk standard offers "relative

simplicity." 388
In recognition of that simplicity as well as the wisdom of
allocating the scope of liability issue to the fact finder, the Louisiana
Supreme Court should adopt and consistently apply the Restatement
(Third) approach to negligence. In that regard, we should borrow from
the Restatement (Third) as it borrowed its risk approach from us. In
adopting the Restatement (Third) approach to duty, the Louisiana
Supreme Court should clearly state that generally a person owes a duty
to exercise reasonable care to others. The general duty to exercise
reasonable care is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article
2315(A), which provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair

386.

See id.

387. Id.

§ 29 cmt. d (first emphasis added).

388.

§ 29 cmt. e.

Id
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it." 389 The Code article is broad and comprehensive in its sweep. A
general duty to exercise reasonable care is consistent with that breadth
and sweep. Moreover, it is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article
2316, which provides, "Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence,
or his want of skill."3 90 As in article 2315, the language of article 2316
is broad. It imposes liability for negligence-a type of faultunfettered by detailed conditions and limitations.
Of course, despite the breadth, Louisiana jurisprudence has long
recognized that the law does not impose unlimited liability, and in
broad categories of cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court may, after an
articulated analysis of the relevant Code articles, policies, and
jurisprudence (both in Louisiana and elsewhere), conclude that the
general duty to exercise reasonable care either should not apply or
should be cabined by other broadly applicable rules. Reynolds provides
a fine example of such a decision.39 1
But where a negligence case does not involve a decision at the
categorical level and the fact-specific scope of liability is at issue, the
fact finder should make that decision, not the judge as lawgiver. That
is because the scope of liability decision at the case-specific level is
exactly that: specific. It depends more upon the facts, fairness, and
common sense than it does upon any policy. It depends upon a sense of
particularized fairness and the common sense of the community, not
social policy, economics, or academic philosophies. I would add that
when a court makes a fairness decision under the guise of deciding a
legal question, it usurps power from the fact finder.392 I also would
argue that in making case-specific fairness decisions, it is difficult to
explain them, and it is precisely the place where one's predetermined
views of the world or of fairness arguably have great influence. Another
way to say that is to say that, in making a gut-level fairness decision,
one's inherent bias may rear its head. Consequently, I would prefer to
have groups of people-juries-making those decisions after
389.
390.
391.
LeJeune v.

LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315(A) (2020).
Id. art. 2316.
See Reynolds v. Benoit, 2014-2362 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 2d 589. See also
Rayne BranchHospital, 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990), where, in an excellent opinion

by Justice Calogero, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a somewhat limited right for
certain bystanders to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The Louisiana
Legislature subsequently codified the claim. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020).

392. The problem is exacerbated at summary judgment when a judge treats the scope
of liability as a legal decision when there are factual issues at stake. In that regard, the court, if
it grants summary judgment, clearly usurps the power of the fact finder.
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discussion with one another, rather than having only one person make
that decision. In cases where the judge is the fact finder, I would urge
her or him to be aware that the scope of responsibility or liability issue
is not a legal decision per se. It calls more on the humanity of the
decision maker than her or his legal training.
I urge the courts to continue to avoid the magic words of
proximate cause, including foreseeability, sole cause, superseding
cause, etc. Instead, the court should ask the jury, when deciding scope
of liability, whether the general type of injury that the plaintiff suffered
was one of the harms risked when the defendant acted, and acted
negligently. That is, "Jurors, do you associate the type of injury which
plaintiff suffered with the risks defendant's conduct posed?" I would
add, but not insist upon, "In so deciding you should rely upon your
common sense, your experience, and your sense of fairness." I believe
the word fairness, while not free of opacity, is much clearer to the
ordinary person than foreseeability, direct, remote, intervening,
superseding, etc. It is, in essence, a command to the fact finder to do
the right thing in the case before the court-and only that case.
So, recapping, who should decide what?
The court should decide duty at a categorical level. That is, are
there policy reasons to limit the general duty to exercise reasonable
care? Here the court should consider the Green policies of tort law, any
applicable Code articles or legislation, and jurisprudence.
Next the jury3 93 should decide whether the defendant breached the
appropriate standard of reasonable care. The jury should decide causein-fact. Thereafter, it should decide scope of liability or protection.
Finally, if it gets that far, the jury should determine damages. Charting
this approach to negligence:
Issue
Duty
Breach
Cause-in-Fact
Scope of Liability/Risk
Damages

Decision Maker
Judge
Jury
Jury
Jury
Jury

393. Assuming reasonable minds could not disagree. If no reasonable person could find
that the defendant breached the standard of care, then the court should decide as a matter of
law (summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict), not
because the issue is legal, but because no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff. The same
thing is true for all the issues entrusted to the jury.
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The table looks remarkably like the table for the traditional elements of
negligence,39 4 but it eschews the words proximate and legal cause in
favor of scope of liability, which is what is really going on. I would
have no objection if a court preferred to refer to it as scope of
responsibility.
In assuring that courts, when deciding duty at the categorical
level, consider and articulate the policies on which they rely, the spirit
of the Realists-Green and Malone-lives on. The law becomes even
more transparent, and courts will both realize and manifest that, in
deciding whether to make an exception to the general duty of care, they
are making choices. And they should, as Green and Malone argued,
articulate the reasons for those choices.
Moreover, in expressly entrusting the scope of liability/risk issue
to the fact finder, courts will make clear that scope of liability issues at
the case-specific level are not legal questions; they are not based on
policy, and they have no precedential value for the future. And in
abandoning the language of proximate or legal cause, the courts will
make the law simpler and will fulfill the legacies of Green and Malone:
eliminate the mumbo jumbo; pull back the curtain; and sensibly
allocate decision-making responsibility.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Law ought to be as simple as possible. It ought to make sense. It
ought to be honest. Today, negligence law in Louisiana is not simple,
the courts' approach to it does not always make clear sense, and the
judicial approach to analyzing negligence is inconsistent. The proposal
set forth herein will go a long way to improving things on all those
fronts.

394.

See also Doucetv. Alleman, 2015-254, p. 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/7/15); 175 So. 3d

1107, 1109 (following essentially the traditional negligence scheme); Carpenter v. Foremost
Signature Ins. Co., 47,008, p. 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/29/12); 87 So. 3d 264, 268 (following

essentially the traditional negligence scheme).

